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END OF THE LINE

Impacts of Resettlement Under
the Railways Project in Phnom



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Sahmakum Teang Tnaut • a Cambodian Urban NGO



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END OF THE LINE

Impacts of Resettlement Under the Railways Project in Phnom Penh

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development induced displacement and resettlement is increasingly recognised as one of the primary drivers of internal displacement worldwide (Pankhurst & Piguet, 2009). Investments in urban and industrial infrastructure, transportation, water supplies and energy generation are vital in order to promote economic growth, increase employment opportunities, and decrease poverty. Yet at the same time, such projects have ‘...all too often left local people permanently displaced, disempowered, and destitute’ (Oliver-Smith, 2009, p. 3).

International finance institutions (IFIs) provide a significant amount of funding for and investment in infrastructure and other projects that result in displacement. Since the 1990s, many of the major IFIs have therefore been developing and implementing progressive and pro-poor Safeguards Policies; increasingly these have placed emphasis on the need to treat displacement as a ‘development opportunity’ (The World Bank, 2004, p. xvii). Nevertheless, and in spite of extensive theory grounded in empirical evidence and decades of practical knowledge and experience amongst implementers, resettlement ‘...has often been so poorly financed, planned, implemented and administered, that [development] projects generally end up being “development disasters”’ (Oliver-Smith, 2009, p. 3). This is true also in Cambodia.

The Greater Mekong Sub-region Rehabilitation of the Railway in Cambodia Project (henceforth the Project) involves the rehabilitation of approximately 594km of railway track and the construction of a further 48km of railway track across the country. Benefits from the Project are expected to include savings in cost and time for the transportation of both goods and people, reduced road traffic, improved road safety, reduced CO2 emissions, and short and long-term job creation (ADB, 2012; AusAID, 2012). The Project’s main funders include the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Government of Australia, and the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC). As a result of the ADB’s involvement, the Bank’s Involuntary Resettlement Policy applies to the Project.

Close to 4,000 Households have, or will be, affected by the rehabilitation of the railways; over a quarter of these require relocation. According to the Project’s initial Resettlement Plan, 161 Households in Phnom Penh were due to be relocated, although only 143 eventually moved after resettlement commenced in September 2011.

Despite the small number of Affected Households and five years of preparation time, Cambodian and international NGOs have highlighted significant flaws in the Project’s resettlement plans and processes. Sahmakum Teang Tnaut (STT) has been conducting extensive monitoring, research, and advocacy in relation to the Project since 2010. As part of its work, STT has highlighted risks associated with resettlement of Affected Households in Phnom Penh.

In 2012, STT conducted an in-depth Household survey with three comparison groups in Phnom Penh - Households regularly resident at the Project-sponsored Trapeang Anhchanh relocation site (TA (Regular)),



Trapeang Anhchanh in September 2011

Households relocated to Trapeang Anhchanh but whose coping mechanism involves predominantly residing elsewhere (TA (Irregular)), and Households who were partially affected by the Project but are still residing along the railway tracks. The original aim was to survey relocated Households against Households remaining along the railway tracks, however, it was soon discovered that a large amount of Households

relocated to Trapeang Anhchanh were not living on the Project-sponsored site on a regular basis, and so the third group was added. Household socio-economic data was gathered pertaining to situations pre- and post-resettlement, and in the case of Households remaining along the tracks, over the 2011-2012 time-period. An analysis of the demographics of each of the groups demonstrated that there are no significant differences between them, making a comparison of outcomes a valid exercise.

Using resettlement expert Michael Cernea's Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) Model (Cernea, 1997; Cernea, 2000) as a theoretical framework, this report aims to use the survey data to analyse the outcome of the displacement and resettlement of Households in Phnom Penh as part of the Project. In addition, it aims to make meaningful and concrete recommendations regarding how the impoverishment of Affected Households might be reversed. The report assesses the impacts of resettlement under the Project against each of the eight risks identified by the IRR Model; landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, increased morbidity, food insecurity, loss of access to community resources, and social disarticulation.

Analysis of the survey data plainly shows that in the short run, Households relocated as part of the Project have been harmed. Though the allocation of land to Affected Households is arguably the central benefit

arising from the resettlement process, Trapeang Anhchanh's remote location undermines the usefulness of the plots, as it does not allow for Affected Households to continue with their previous income-generating activities. The selection of Trapeang Anhchanh as the relocation site also exemplifies disregard for the Affected Households' key priorities, namely living 'close to a market' and 'close to the city'.

Economic marginalisation of TA (Regular) Households has been aggravated by resettlement. Levels of employment have declined: 57% of TA (Regular) Households contain someone who has lost their job since resettlement, compared with 12% of Railway Households and 14% of TA (Irregular) Households. Of those who lost their jobs among TA (Regular) Households 62% were women, suggesting women in particular have become economically marginalised following relocation. Corresponding with this fact, TA (Regular) incomes have declined dramatically since resettlement; in 2011, only 23% of individual income earners earned less than US\$75 per month; in 2012 this figure rose to 46%. In the same time period Household incomes halved from US\$344 to US\$183, while 85% of the Households stated they perceive their overall economic situation as having 'worsened' or 'greatly worsened' since resettlement. In contrast, there was no significant difference in the gross income of Railway Households between 2011 and 2012; 83% of Railway Households stated their economic situation has 'stayed the same' in the last 12 months.

Previous STT research (Sahmakum Teang Tnaut, 2011; Sahmakum Teang Tnaut, 2012) has documented how inadequate, and sometimes incorrect, compensation was likely to leave Affected Households worse off, and unable to rebuild their homes and lives at Trapeang Anhchanh. Data presented in this report shows how resettled Households were only able to avoid homelessness by assuming large and unsustainable levels of debt; 98% of TA (Regular) Households owe money to someone and 97% of these say that they are struggling to repay their debt. This compares to 52% of Railway Households and 61% of TA (Irregular) Households. Debts amongst TA (Regular) Households are also larger and more expensive than those held by Households in the comparison groups, and concerns remain that the Households could lose their plots – used as collateral – to informal moneylenders. If left unresolved, the on-going issue of debt is likely to undermine all and any interventions at Trapeang Anhchanh.

A positive aspect of the relocation appears to be the improvement in access to utilities for TA (Regular) Households, who now enjoy better, and often cheaper, access to electricity, water and toilet facilities. However, access to services such as health care and education appears to have been compromised. The data does not allow for an in-depth analysis of the risk of morbidity, but it does capture access to health care providers. Only 6% of TA (Regular) Households report using the government health post at the site. Instead, the majority of TA (Regular) Households travel over 20km to the 'most usual' health service provider, mainly private hospitals. In contrast, 90% of Railway and 75% of TA (Irregular) Households travel between 0 and 5km to access their 'most usual' health care providers. TA (Regular) Households thus incur three times higher monthly transportation costs for medical treatments than the Households in the two other groups. Likewise, overall school attendance among children in the TA (Regular) population is, at 77%, noticeably lower than in the two other groups where attendance is 92% and 85% among Railway and TA (Irregular) children respectively. The main reason cited by TA (Regular) Households for their children's lack of attendance at school was limited Household income.

Figures on per person per day food expenditure further reveal the impact that relocation has had on TA (Regular) Households: median food expenditure per person per day was only 2,500 Riel for TA (Regular) residents, compared with 3,875 Riel for TA (Irregular) residents, and 3,333 Riel for Railway residents. Although there are limitations to STT's methodology, it appears likely that the food expenditures of TA (Regular) Households were not significantly different from the World Bank's 2007 urban food poverty line, while those of the two other groups were significantly above.

While social disarticulation is challenging to measure, it appears that self-reported levels of social capital, trust, and community cohesion have also been negatively impacted by the resettlement process: 15% of TA (Regular) Households believe that they do not have many good friends or neighbours in the community;

only 22% stated that they believe that generally speaking, ‘people can be trusted’ and 43% of TA (Regular) Households either strongly disagreed or disagreed with the statement ‘I feel safe and secure in this community’.

In conclusion, the data analysis reveals that the regular residents of Trapeang Anhchanh fare the worst when analysed against the risks outlined in Cernea’s IRR model. Inadequate compensation, lack of income-generating opportunities, resettlement-related debt, and significant delays and failures in income restoration programmes are highlighted as key causes for the resettlement failure. The TA (Irregular) group, i.e. Households whose coping strategy involves not residing at the Project-sponsored resettlement site, fare somewhat better, mainly as a result of not having spent funds on rebuilding housing at Trapeang Anhchanh, and as a result of living nearby income-generating opportunities. In contrast, the living standards of the Railway residents are found to have remained largely unchanged for 2011-2012. As such, the data presented in this report strongly indicates that the impoverishment and marginalisation of Households relocated to Trapeang Anhchanh is resettlement-related.

The failures inherent in the Project highlight that there is a clear need for the RGC to develop a comprehensive rights-based Relocation Policy to act as a framework for project-specific Resettlement Plans in the future. Such a policy should be centred on disclosure of and meaningful consultation on Resettlement Plans prior to their approval, and participation by Affected Households in all stages of resettlement. This transparency must also be extended to the tendering and awarding of project-related contracts, such as the implementation of income restoration programmes. In addition, monitoring of resettlement and project impacts, including commitment to timely public disclosure of independent monitoring reports, must be strengthened. The IRR model could be used as a framework for the identification and mitigation of risks before a resettlement event occurs.

A number of specific lessons can also be learnt from resettlement under the Project. With a view of improving future resettlement outcomes, significantly more extensive support needs to be provided to relocating Households, including the additional 105 Households still due to be relocated in Phnom Penh under the Project. Such support should include advice and assistance in terms of budgeting for construction costs, purchasing materials in bulk, allowing time for incremental building, and training in housing construction. Project partners should also provide access to appropriate housing finance options prior to resettlement as part of the compensation package. In addition, income restoration activities, such as the provision of training, identification of viable and secure employment opportunities close to the resettlement site, and the establishment of savings groups, should commence prior to relocation. Social safety net programmes, which are already being implemented throughout Cambodia, could also be extended to resettled communities.

The most immediate need however pertains to addressing the situation at Trapeang Anhchanh. Data presented in this report outlines how resettlement under the Project in Phnom Penh has not lived up to the standards of the ADB Involuntary Resettlement Policy, which demands that Affected Households’ living standards after relocation should be at least equivalent to pre-project levels. Instead of an opportunity for poverty reduction, resettlement under the Project has led to relocating Households assuming unsustainable levels of debt, and losing their livelihoods. Given the impoverishment and marginalisation suffered particularly by TA (Regular) Households, there is therefore a prominent need for Project partners to redouble their efforts to address the impacts of failed resettlement and – together with the Affected Households – develop a comprehensive corrective action plan to restore livelihoods and bring the Project back into compliance.

ACRONYMS

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
COI	Corridor of Impact
CRP	Compliance Review Panel
CUFA	Credit Union Foundation Australia
DMS	Detailed Measurement Survey
EC	Equitable Cambodia
EDC	Electricite du Cambodge
EIRP	Expanded Income Restoration Programme
GMS	Greater Mekong Sub-Region
IDI	Inclusive Development International
IRC	Inter-Ministerial Resettlement Committee
IRP	Income Restoration Programme
LICADHO	Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights
MFI	Micro-finance Institution
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OSPF	Office of the Special Project Facilitator
PPWSA	Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority
RGC	Royal Government of Cambodia
ROW	Right of Way
STT	Sahmakum Teang Thaut
TA	Trapeang Anhchanh

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1 INTRODUCTION

Development induced displacement and resettlement is increasingly recognised as one of the primary drivers of internal displacement worldwide (Pankhurst & Piguet, 2009). The World Bank estimates that during the last two decades of the 20th century, 200 million people were forcibly displaced as a result of development and infrastructure projects. The scale and frequency of new development projects in low and middle income countries, along with the corresponding numbers of people affected by such projects, has accelerated in the 21st century with an estimated 15 million people affected each year (Cernea, 2006, p. 26; Oliver-Smith, 2009, p. 3). There is no doubt that for many countries investments in urban and industrial infrastructure, transportation, water supplies and energy generation are vital in order to promote economic growth, increase employment opportunities, and decrease poverty. Yet at the same time, such projects have ‘...all too often left local people permanently displaced, disempowered, and destitute’ (Oliver-Smith, 2009, p. 3).

The resettlement of affected people is now regarded as a ‘development issue’ (ADB, 1995, p. 8) and there has long been consensus amongst academics and policy makers that it is wholly unacceptable that sacrifices should be made, often by the poorest and most vulnerable members of society, for the ‘greater good’ of national economic development (ADB, 1995, p. 8; Cernea, 2000). Yet certain population segments continue to suffer disproportionately from development induced displacement and resettlement; these segments are often the least equipped to do so. Resettlement often leads to the simultaneous and cumulative loss of natural, man-made, human, and social capital which can swiftly lead to impoverishment through the loss of income, assets, rights, social networks, and self-confidence (Cernea, 2000; Cernea, 2003). According to the Asian Development Bank:

Many development projects that require involuntary displacement of people generally have adverse economic, social, and environmental impacts on the displaced people. Homes are abandoned, production systems are dismantled, and productive assets and income sources are lost. Displaced people may be relocated to environments where their skills may be less applicable, the competition for resources may be greater, and host populations may be hostile or culturally incompatible. Well-established community structures, social networks, and kinship ties may be broken or weakened. Cultural identity, traditional authority, and the potential for mutual help may be diminished....The absence of appropriate development measures for compensation, resettlement, and rehabilitation of the displaced people may (i) cause severe long-term hardship, impoverishment, and even decimation of the affected communities; (ii) adversely affect the host populations; and (iii) lead to severe environmental damage.

(ADB, 1995, p. 3).

Moreover, while the risks and costs of such projects are often externalised to affected people, the benefits are rarely shared, resulting in fundamental questions around social justice and equity.

The major international finance institutions (IFIs) have been developing and implementing progressive and pro-poor Safeguards Policies since the 1990s, influenced mainly by the World Bank, which formulated its first policy on involuntary resettlement in 1980 as an internal Operational Manual Statement. In recognition of the fact that borrower states may have vastly different legislative frameworks (specifically in relation to the acquisition of land), as well as differential understandings of their commitments under international law, IFIs developed Safeguards Policies for ethical, as well as pragmatic reasons. While it was clearly intolerable that ‘new poverty take root under the wings of programmes that aim to reduce pre-existing poverty’ (Cernea, 2003, p. 41), there was also a growing acknowledgement of that fact that inadequate resettlement processes could potentially jeopardise multi-million dollar projects as local resistance, political tensions and implementation delays translate into increased costs and delays in the flow of benefits from projects (ADB, 1995, p. 7). Indeed the ‘costs of implementation problems caused by a lack of good involuntary resettlement can far exceed the costs of proper resettlement’ (ADB, 1995, p. 8).

Involuntary Resettlement Safeguard Policies are designed in order to mitigate the risks associated with forced displacement. They aim to lay out detailed guidelines for assessing the social impacts and identifying the risks associated with a project, analysing each specific risk, planning and implementing for risk prevention or mitigation, and closely monitoring the progress of affected people, in some cases even after the project term has ended. The importance of meaningful consultation and communication with affected people underpins effective Safeguard Policies and is considered to be a vital component of the most effective resettlement plans. Affected people are usually entitled to a resettlement package comprising compensation at full replacement costs for lost land, assets, and livelihoods, and assistance and benefits for both physical and economic displacement. Assistance may be in the form of transportation support, security of tenure, better housing, subsistence allowance for food or fuel, and access to credit, training opportunities and employment. Benefits are derived from the project itself and may involve companies allocating revenues from the project to establish facilities for affected people, and priority training and employment in project activities. Special attention is paid to the resettlement impacts on female headed Households, the elderly, people with disabilities, ethnic minorities or indigenous people, and other vulnerable groups. Grievance redress mechanisms provide an avenue for people who believe that they have been adversely affected by a project.

Safeguard Policies have increasingly placed emphasis on the need to treat displacement as a ‘development opportunity’ (The World Bank, 2004, p. xvii). In 1995, the opening paragraph of the Asian Development Bank’s 1995 Involuntary Resettlement Safeguard Policy stated that:

....people who may be adversely affected should be consulted; compensated for their losses; and assisted to rebuild their homes and communities, re-establish their enterprises, and develop their potentials as productive members of society at a level generally at least equivalent to that which was likely to have prevailed in the absence of the development intervention.

(ADB, 1995, p. 1).

ADB’s updated 2009 Safeguard Policy Statement is seemingly more ambitious in that it aims to:

....enhance or at least restore the livelihoods of all displaced persons in real terms, relative to pre-project levels; and to improve the standards of living of the displaced poor and other vulnerable groups.

(ADB, 2009, p. 17).

Yet in spite of the existence of Safeguards Policies, extensive theory grounded in empirical evidence, and decades of practical knowledge and experience amongst implementers, resettlement ‘...has often been so

poorly financed, planned, implemented and administered, that [development] projects generally end up being “development disasters” (Oliver-Smith, 2009, p. 3).

Using Cernea’s Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction Model (Cernea, 1997; Cernea, 2000) as a theoretical framework, this report aims to assess the outcome of the displacement and resettlement of Households in Phnom Penh as part of the ADB and AusAID-funded Greater Mekong Sub-region Rehabilitation of the Railway in Cambodia Project. According to the initial Resettlement Plan 161 Households were due to be relocated, although only 143 eventually moved when resettlement commenced in September 2011. Analysing the data collected in a detailed Household survey of fully and partially Affected Households, and in close consultation with affected communities, the report also hopes to make meaningful and concrete recommendations regarding how the impoverishment of Affected Households might be reversed.

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

2

2.1. Resettlement in Cambodia

Displacement is not a new phenomenon in Cambodia. Although figures are hard to establish, hundreds of thousands of people are presumed to have been displaced since the return of nominal peace in the 1990s. Increasingly, displacement has been development-induced; local human rights organisation Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LICADHO) reports that since 1993, over 2.1 million hectares of land have been transferred from subsistence farmers to agro-industrial firms, while at least 400,000 people have been affected by land disputes since 2003 (LICADHO, 2012).

In Phnom Penh, over 10% of the city's current population, representing over 150,000 people, has been displaced over the last two decades (Sahmakum Teang Tnaut, 2011). Some of those displaced have ended up in the 54 relocation sites located at the outskirts of the capital, where living standards are usually poorer, access to utilities often more expensive, and income-generation opportunities limited. (Sahmakum Teang Tnaut, 2012) Indeed, the Royal Government of Cambodia's (RGC) 'relocation policy', articulated by the Prime Minister in 2000 (UN-Habitat, 2003), has by and large resulted in slum creation around Phnom Penh's increasingly gentrifying core. Though often termed relocations, the majority of displacements from central Phnom Penh have amounted to little more than forced evictions. A few early exceptions exist, notably the relocation of around 130 families from Veng Sreng to Aphiwat Meanchey in 1999, which were characterised by an element of community consultation and participation. However, since 2001 a practice of so-called 'emergency relocation' has been in place, often involving forced eviction and disposing of evictees on empty, undeveloped plots outside the city (Urban Resource Centre, 2002). Recent research by STT indicates that relocation sites have over time been established increasingly far from the centre of the city, resulting in lower living standards for those evicted (Sahmakum Teang Tnaut, 2012).

The ADB is no stranger to relocation in Cambodia, and has a poor track record. In 2001, some 320 families were relocated from the Kob Sroeu dyke in Phnom Penh, as part of an ADB-funded flood prevention project. Affected Households were moved to two separate sites, one 4ha site located less than 1km from the dyke, and another 2ha site located 2-3km away. While the larger site was equipped with basic services, 'on the smallest and most isolated site, no underground water was found, access was not adequate, and people experienced more hardships' (Urban Resource Centre, 2002, p. 23). A review of the resettlement found that the project's resettlement plan had been implemented without the ADB's approval, and criticised the lack of livelihoods restoration measures following the resettlement (Urban Resource Centre, 2002, p. 23).

Similarly, as part of the ADB-funded Highway One Improvement Project approved in December 1998, over 1,200 Households were resettled in fashion that 'caused myriad problems, including landlessness' (Oxfam Australia, 2007, p. 16) for the Affected Households. Civil society actors monitoring the case highlighted, in particular, insufficient participation, consultation, and information disclosure, as well as flawed compensation measures and insufficient budget for rehabilitation, as leading to safeguards violations and

harms caused to Affected Households (International Accountability Project). Following several complaints by those affected, including a complaint to the ADB Accountability Mechanism, additional compensation was delivered. A Technical Assistance Project including ‘a belated remedial income restoration program (delivered seven years after initial displacement) aimed at assisting 63 affected households’ (ADB, 2011, p. 2) was also implemented between April 2010 and November 2011. According to the ADB, ‘[t]he debt restructuring exercise which turned into one of debt relief, rescued 63 affected households from a state of paralysing indebtedness to moneylenders and vulnerability to losing their homes and land’ (ADB, 2011, p. 2). As part of the Technical Assistance, additional funds were also allocated to build the capacity of Government personnel and independent professionals involved in resettlement and income restoration on public infrastructure development projects. The capacity building focused on short-term training courses and opportunities for postgraduate studies at the Royal University of Phnom Penh. According to the final report following the completion of the Technical Assistance, ‘it is too early to measure outcome of the training program in terms of enhanced capacity of Government and independent resettlement professionals to design, manage, and supervise income restoration projects for resettlement-affected people’ (ADB, 2011, p. 2).

In 2000, the ADB provided Technical Assistance to the RGC with the aim of enhancing the resettlement legal framework and institutional capacity by developing a draft national resettlement policy, including technical guidelines, for Cambodia. The estimated cost of the assistance was US\$480,000 (ADB, 2004). The project however failed, to the effect that Cambodia today lacks a resettlement policy, and resettlement is conducted by a variety of actors ranging from the Inter-Ministerial Resettlement Committee (IRC), through Municipalities, to private companies. As a result, the quality of resettlement varies significantly case by case.

2.2. The Project

The Greater Mekong Sub-region Rehabilitation of the Railway in Cambodia Project (henceforth *the Project*) involves the rehabilitation of approximately 594km of railway track and the construction of a further 48km of railway track between Poipet on the border with Thailand, via Phnom Penh, to Sihanoukville on the South coast of Cambodia. Freight storage facilities in Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville will also be constructed. This is part of a larger project which aims to improve rail connectivity across the six countries in the Sub-region. ADB estimates that the project will ‘...generate an economic internal rate of return of about 28%...during the first 20 years of railway operation’ (ADB, 2012, p. 1). Cambodians are expected to benefit from savings in cost and time for the transportation of both goods and people, reduced road traffic, improved road safety (including the removal of dangerous and flammable cargo from road to rail), reduced CO2 emissions, and short and long-term job creation (ADB, 2012; AusAID, 2012).

The total cost of the project was originally projected to be US\$141.6 million, with contributions from the Asian Development Bank (US\$84 million), the Government of Australia (US\$21.5 million), the Royal Government of Cambodia (US\$20.3), the OPEC Fund for International Development (US\$13 million), and the Government of Malaysia (US\$2.8 million in kind). The loan for the project was originally approved by ADB in December 2006, but was further modified and approved in December 2009 (ADB, 2013). The Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) committed an additional AU\$1 million in 2011 towards an Expanded Income Restoration Programme (EIRP) and AU\$1 million in 2012, in order to ‘support families who have had a tough time adjusting to life after being resettled’ (AusAID, 2012, p. 2).

2.3. Resettlement Impact

Resettlement under the project is the responsibility of the Cambodian Government, and is implemented through the Inter-Ministerial Resettlement Committee (IRC). The scale of the Project’s resettlement impact

was minimised through the use of a Corridor of Impact (COI) approach. As a result, in the most densely populated urban areas in Phnom Penh, Pursat, Battambang, and Sihanoukville, only those Households resident in main structures which were wholly or mainly located within 7m of the centre of the track (3.5m on each side) would be required to relocate. This is in contrast with the Right of Way (ROW) approach which would have impacted structures much further from the centreline of the railway. In addition, although the majority of Affected Households were considered to be ‘illegal settlers or squatters’ (Ministry of Public Works and Transport, 2010, p. 1), the RGC agreed to not discriminate against these Households and provide assistance in the form of compensation at replacement cost, entitlements, and benefits to all Affected Households, regardless of their tenure status, as per ADB safeguards requirements.


The Project’s designated relocation site in Phnom Penh is Trapeang Anhchanh, located in a peri-urban area some 20km from the city centre in Pur Senchey district. At the site, plots measuring 7x15m have been allocated for all Affected Households requiring resettlement. The site is located adjacent to an older relocation site, now known as Trapeang Anhchanh Chas.

The Updated Resettlement Plan for the Phnom Penh Section divides the Affected Households into the following categories:

- I. **Relocating AHs to the project sponsored site (henceforth Fully Affected Households)** – Refers to AHs who will entirely lose his/her[sic] affected land and structure, regardless [of] ownership status, or lose partially but [the] remaining portion is not viable for future use, or have less than 30m² of land area. These Households will be considered Landless AHs. According to DMS data 161 AHs will become landless and they are entitled to relocate to the resettlement site sponsored by the Project.
- II. **Self-relocation option. AHs with totally affected houses but are self-relocating** – 8 AHs have opted to self-relocate to the residual area of the ROW in an adjoining village.
- III. **Move back on remaining ROW**
 - **AHs with partially or totally affected main structure but could re-organize in the residual area of the ROW (henceforth Partially Affected Households):** Refers to Affected Households who occupy or lease the affected land and own or rent the affected structure. The affected structure may be partially or fully dismantled and require reconstruction in the remaining land or ROW. According to DMS data, 570 AHs will be able to re-organise their houses on the remaining land behind the COI in the residual area of the ROW.
 - **AHs with affected independent shops/stalls:** Refers to AHs who own shops or stalls located within the COI that are not attached to the house. According to DMS data, there are 35 AHs in this category.
 - **AHs lose other structure and/or crops and trees:** Refers to AHs who lose other secondary structures and/or perennial trees. According to DMS data 502 AHs fall under this category.
- IV. **Tenant:** Can be renters of the affected structure. Because of the Project they will lose their present habitat and require [sic] looking for [a] new place. According to DMS data 13 AHs will be required looking [sic] for a new renting place.

(Ministry of Public Works and Transport, 2010, pp. 5-6)

127 Affected Households were considered to be vulnerable, entitling them to additional resettlement benefits.




2.4 RESETTLEMENT TIMELINE

In order to ensure compliance with the ADB Safeguard Policy (1995) and the Operational Manual (2006), preparations for resettlement commenced in 2006 and were subject to multiple negotiations and iterations between the ADB and the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC). In Phnom Penh, resettlement of Fully Affected Households finally began in September 2011. The major resettlement-related events are outlined above:

Despite the small number of fully Affected Households, five years of preparation time, and the contracting of an external project monitor, REDECAM, whose role was to monitor and report on resettlement implementation, Cambodian and international NGOs have highlighted significant flaws in the resettlement process. Key concerns have been raised in relation to the amounts of compensation awarded and the methodology of the compensation calculations, the unsuitability and insufficient preparation of the Project-sponsored resettlement sites, the lack of affordable housing finance options extended to Affected Households, and the inadequacy of the Income Restoration Programme (IRP) and the Expanded Income Restoration Programme (EIRP) (Sahmakum Teang Tnaut, 2011; Bridges Across Borders Cambodia, 2012; Sahmakum Teang Tnaut, 2012). Indeed, a careful analysis of the Updated Resettlement Plan for the Phnom Penh Section (2010) reveals a failure to fully explore, acknowledge, and mitigate the impoverishment risks inherent in this Project, resulting in an almost inevitable cycle of impoverishment amongst the fully Affected Households (Cernea, 2000, p. 54).

Communities in Cambodia have grown increasingly vocal about land and resettlement-related issues in recent years, and Affected Households have worked with local human rights NGOs to make full use of available accountability mechanisms. In November 2011, Bridges Across Borders Cambodia (BABC) submitted a complaint on behalf of Affected Households to the ADB's Office of the Special Project Facilitator (OSPF), one arm of the agency's Accountability Mechanism. The complaint was found eligible, and since 2012 the OSPF has been in the process of resolving complaints submitted by individual Affected Households. In August 2012, a further complaint was submitted to the ADB's Compliance Review Panel (CRP) by Inclusive Development International (IDI) on behalf of Affected Households. The CRP found the complaint eligible and has recommended to the ADB Board of Directors that a project-wide compliance review should be initiated; investigations are currently on-going. In October 2012 Equitable Cambodia (EC) and IDI submitted a complaint on behalf of 30 Affected Households to the Australian Human Rights Commission (ADB, 2012).



Sources: <http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/projdocs>; Ministry of Public Works and Transport, 2010.

2.5. The Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction Model

The RGC and its contracting agencies, ADB, AusAID, the Affected Households, and the various NGOs which have been monitoring the Project all acknowledge the strengths and shortcomings of the resettlement process, and have been attempting to devise potential solutions. Detailed data and a comprehensive framework for analysis and problem resolution have been lacking, however. The Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) Model was developed by Cernea (Cernea, 1997; 2000) in order to highlight the intrinsic risks associated with development induced displacement, and importantly, to create a safeguarding tool which policy makers, planners and implementers could use to mitigate, counteract or reverse such risks, or at least to decrease their magnitude. The most widespread risks, and their countervailing mitigation strategies are outlined below:

- I. *From landlessness to land-based resettlement*
- II. *From joblessness to re-employment*
- III. *From homelessness to house reconstruction*
- IV. *From marginalisation to social inclusion*
- V. *From increased morbidity to improved health care*
- VI. *From food insecurity to adequate nutrition*
- VII. *From loss of access to restoration of community assets and services*
- VIII. *From social disarticulation to networks and community rebuilding.*

(Cernea, 2000, p. 20).

The advantages of the IRR Model are its flexibility and its multi-functionality; it can be used as a predictive, diagnostic, problem-resolution, and research tool. While many institutions use the model in the resettlement planning and diagnostic phase, this report has used the model to conduct an evaluation of the impacts of resettlement. The model has provided a 'conceptual scaffolding for conducting and organising....theory-led research' (Cernea, 2000, p. 22) and has allowed the Research Team to explore the interactions between different variables, combine them into one conceptual framework, and devise potential solutions to the problems currently faced by the Affected Households. The model also potentially enables a comparison of research findings with other resettlement events in Cambodia, and elsewhere.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

3

3.1. Objectives

The objective of this research is to use Cernea's Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction Model to assess the socio-economic outcomes of the GMS Rehabilitation of Cambodia Project in Phnom Penh, and analyse the extent to which the resettlement risks outlined in the model have been mitigated. The specific objectives are as follows:

- I. To collect detailed socio-economic data from Fully and Partially Affected Households in order to assess the extent to which there has been resettlement-related impoverishment as a result of the Project.
- II. To use the findings to make specific recommendations which may help to mitigate the risks of further impoverishment and furthermore improve the situations of Affected Households.
- III. To use the specific findings and recommendations to devise a broader set of recommendations regarding how development-related resettlement in Cambodia might be better planned and implemented in the future, and therefore better able to mitigate the risks of impoverishment.

3.2. Assessing Impact

Establishing causal relationships and assessing the outcomes and impact of a specific project or policy intervention on an individual, or a group of individuals, is extremely challenging. In any attempt to assess impact it is necessary to consider the counterfactual, which can most clearly be described as '... an estimate of what the outcome...would have been for a programme participant in the absence of the programme' (Gertler, Martinez, Premand, Rawlings, & Vermeersch, 2011, p. 35). While constructing an exact counterfactual is impossible, it can be possible to 'mimic' the counterfactual to allow a meaningful comparison of the outcomes of those individuals affected by a given intervention, with the outcomes of similar individuals who were unaffected by the intervention.

In the case of the Railway Rehabilitation Project, the Fully Affected Households were required to relocate due to the proximity of their homes (or 'main structures') to the railway track. A large number of Partially Affected Households living in the same communities were not resettled because their properties were located just outside of the Corridor of Impact, or because they were able to re-organise in the residual Right of Way. In order to incorporate the concept of the counterfactual into this research, the Research Team decided to interview both Fully Affected Households that were relocated and Partially Affected

Households that were not relocated, comparing their situations and characteristics immediately prior to resettlement with their outcomes approximately twelve months after the resettlement had occurred. Importantly this has allowed a ‘difference in difference’ evaluation for a small number of key variables, with the change in outcome variable between 2011 and 2012 for the partially Affected Households in the comparison group giving an approximation of the counterfactual Before and after comparisons amongst Fully Affected Households, and simple ex-post comparisons of Fully and Partially Affected Households have also been utilised (Gertler, Martinez, Premand, Rawlings, & Vermeersch, 2011).

3.3. Group Definition

As outlined above, the original intention was to draw comparisons between relocated Fully Affected Households and Partially Affected Households which were not required to relocate, both before and after the intervention. It became clear, however, that a minority of Fully Affected Households had constructed a small structure on the resettlement site after relocation, but continued to live and work in Phnom Penh or elsewhere. This has been a common feature of previous resettlement events in Phnom Penh, but there is limited concrete data on the whereabouts and characteristics of Households who, for a variety of reasons, decide to reject the option of residing full-time in the resettlement site. The Research Team was able to locate and survey 28 Households in this position, and these Households formed a third comparison group in the analysis. The characteristics of the three groups are outlined in Table 2.

3.4. Sampling Frame and Sample Size

Railway Residents

According to the Updated Resettlement Plan for Phnom Penh, the number of Households with a partially affected main structure was 570. With a confidence level of 95% and a confidence interval of 10%, the sample size was deemed to be 83 Households. To allow for refusals, limitations to data quality, and missing data it was necessary to add a further 10% to the sample size making a total of 91 Households surveyed, and a representative from each Household was interviewed. A ‘representative’ was defined as either the head of the household, or in his/her absence, the spouse. In five cases, where neither the head of the household or the spouse could be contacted, the respondent was an adult child.

In order to ensure that there was no bias in the Household selection process, a systematic random sampling method was employed, meaning that each non-relocated Partially Affected Household had an equal chance of being selected to participate in the survey. Systematic sampling was facilitated by the fact that the ‘Railway Residents’ Households are located in linear pattern parallel to the railway tracks. The sampling interval was 6, calculated from the total population size/sample size ($570/91=6.2$). A starting Household was selected by lottery at the northern end of the railway track in Kilometre 6 Commune and subsequently each 6th Affected Household was interviewed. In most instances the homes of Affected Households were demarcated with a red number. Where this was not visible, it was assumed that if a main structure was located directly behind the COI of 3.5m from the centre of the track, it was a Partially Affected Household. If a main structure was located some distance outside the 3.5m COI, it was not considered to be a Partially Affected Household. The Households in Toul Sangke A which are Affected Households but have not been relocated due to their on-going complaint to ADB’s OSPF were not included in this research.

Table 1 Definition of the Three Comparison Groups

Group Name	Status According to the Project	Residential status in Summer 2012	Number of Households surveyed	
Railway Residents	Partially Affected Households – Households which were able to re-organise in the residual Right of Way.	Currently still resident along the railway tracks between the Phnom Penh Railway Station and Kilometre 6, in Toul Kork and Russei Keo Districts, Phnom Penh.	91	Railway
Trapeang Anhchanh Residents (Regular)	Fully Affected Households – Households which relocated to the project-sponsored resettlement site in Trapeang Anhchanh.	Resident in Trapeang Anhchanh resettlement site for at least four nights per week.	68	TA (Regular)
Trapeang Anhchanh Residents (Irregular)	Fully Affected Households – Households which relocated to the project-sponsored resettlement site in Trapeang Anhchanh.	Resident for less than four nights per week in Trapeang Anhchanh resettlement site. Predominantly renting properties close to their previous homes in Toul Kork and Russei Keo Districts, Phnom Penh.	28	TA (Irregular)

Before commencing the surveying with a given Household, the selected Household was asked if it was a Partially Affected Household. If it was not, the Household was not surveyed and the next Partially Affected Household was selected. This was to ensure that the Households selected were as similar as possible to the relocated Fully Affected Households.

Trapeang Anhchanh Residents (Regular)

According the Updated Resettlement Plan (Ministry of Public Works and Transport, 2010) 161 Households were to be relocated to the project sponsored resettlement site; 143 Households subsequently accepted compensation to move to the site, while 18 Households have to date refused. In Trapeang Anhchanh, the Research Team was able to locate 68 Households who were ‘regularly’ resident on-site, and a representative from each Household was interviewed. A ‘representative’ was defined as either the head of the household, or in his/her absence, the spouse. In one case, where neither the head of the household or the spouse could be contacted, the respondent was an adult child.

Trapeang Anhchanh Residents (Irregular)

The Research Team was only able to contact 28 Households who relocated to Trapeang Anhchanh resettlement site, but who currently reside ‘irregularly’ in Trapeang Anhchanh. A representative from each of these Households was interviewed. A ‘representative’ was defined as either the head of the household, or in his/her absence, the spouse.

3.5. Survey Development

The survey and sampling guidelines were developed by the STT Research Team in English and translated into Khmer, incorporating feedback from other STT staff familiar with resettlement issues. Survey questions were devised in order to encompass each risk in Cernea's Risks and Reconstruction Model. Where relevant, questions were based on those employed during the 2008 Cambodian Social and Economic Survey (CSES) as it was assumed that these questions were culturally relevant and had already undergone a rigorous testing process. The survey was divided into 10 sections:

- Section 1: Respondent characteristics and Household demographics;
- Section 2: Housing Status, housing quality, community infrastructure and access to utilities;
- Section 3: Access to health care, frequency of access, and health care expenditures;
- Section 4: Education access and attendance;
- Section 5: Food security;
- Section 6: Household finances: Incomes, expenditures and savings;
- Section 7: Indebtedness;
- Section 8: Community challenges;
- Section 9: Household coping strategies;
- Section 10: Social capital.

The survey was tested prior to implementation and the flow and content of a number of questions were modified. Enumerators were thoroughly trained, with special attention paid to the questions around income, savings and indebtedness, due to the complexity of collecting detailed financial data from Households whose members are predominantly employed in the informal sector or self-employed.

The survey was conducted with Regular Residents in Trapeang Anhchanh resettlement site in July and August 2012, with Irregular Residents at various locations in August and September 2012, and with the Railway Residents in September and early October 2012.

3.6. Research Ethics

Having worked in the Project-affected communities for some time, STT staff members enjoy a considerable level of trust and respect amongst community members. It was, however, vital to ensure that research was conducted in an unbiased manner and that proper research ethics protocols were followed. The following concepts were explained to all participating Households:

- Voluntary participation;
- Confidentiality;
- Anonymity;
- Participants were assured that the information that they provided would be used for research and advocacy purposes only, and would not be used by any institution or individual to make decisions about potential access to future services or benefits;
- Informed consent – enumerators sought verbal consent from participants before commencing the survey.

3.7. Ensuring Data Quality

The Research Advisor and Field Supervisors conducted spot checks to observe enumerators' interactions with participants and to ensure the quality of questioning and the recording of responses. At the end of each day, Field Supervisors reviewed each survey before the enumerators left the field location for data quality, completeness and accuracy. Gaps and mistakes in the survey were identified in order that enumerators could provide the correct answers while the responses were still fresh. Data was then cleaned a second time in the office, and missing data and inconsistencies were identified. Data was entered using MS Excel and Epi-Data.

3.8. Limitations

A number of limitations, both methodological and practical, should be highlighted:

Sample Size

Due to resource and time constraints, the sample size amongst Railway Households was just 91.

Response and Recall Bias

Response bias may occur when participants intentionally respond to a question in a manner that is in line with their perceptions regarding the social desirability of a given response. In this instance, participants may, for example, give a different response to an NGO than they would to an implementing agency or to the RGC. Recall bias may occur when participants' memories systematically affect their ability to answer a question accurately. Unfortunately STT was unable to collect baseline data in 2011. This means that answers that refer to Households' situations in 2011 may be less accurate. Various methods were employed to mitigate the risk of response and recall bias, including cross-checking and the use of key events on the annual calendar to prompt more accurate recollection.

Lack of Double Data Entry

A lack of resources meant that the team only entered the data once, meaning a reduced likelihood that data entry errors were highlighted.

Assumption of Similarity of the Comparison Group

In conducting this research it has been assumed that the intervention groups (Trapeang Anhchanh Residents Regular & Irregular) shared similar characteristics to the comparison group (Railway Residents) prior to resettlement. It has also been assumed that the comparison group would have theoretically reacted to resettlement in the same way. Thirdly, it has been assumed that the comparison group and the intervention groups have not been differentially exposed to other development policies or interventions (Gertler, Martinez, Premand, Rawlings, & Vermeersch, 2011). It is clearly difficult to evaluate the strength of these assumptions. Households received varying amounts of compensation, and Fully Affected

Households have received greater support from development agencies since resettlement. In addition, proximity to the railway track meant that some Fully Affected Households which were resettled were perhaps wealthier initially due to their business activities on the railway track itself. Alternatively, along some stretches of the railway track, those Households which were closer to the track appeared to be poorer and more vulnerable, and may have arrived in the community more recently, therefore settling on the most marginal pieces of land.

Given the fairly limited time and resources, however, the Research Team felt that an imperfect comparison group was still preferable to no comparison group, and that because until 2011 all Affected Households had lived in the same communities as neighbours, the Railway Residents who were partially affected by the Project, but were not forced to resettle, could reasonably be expected to have similar characteristics to the fully affected Households who were resettled.

RESPONDENTS' AND HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHICS

4.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to describe the basic characteristics of the survey respondents, and introduce the demographics of respondents' Households. As discussed in section 2.4.8 above, it is useful to analyse whether the characteristics of the three groups are similar, and highlight any important differences which may impact upon findings outlined in other sections of the report.

4.2. Findings

Gender and Marital Status of Respondents

The data suggests that a slightly higher proportion of TA (Regular) respondents are widowed, potentially lowering earning capacities and increasing the levels of vulnerability experienced by their Households.

Table 2 Gender and Marital Status of Respondents

	Railway	TA (Regular)	TA (Irregular)
	(n=91)	(n=68)	(n=28)
Gender			
Male	32%	38%	46%
Female	68%	62%	54%
Total	100%	100%	100%
Marital status			
Single	5.5%	2%	0%
Married or living together	71%	73%	82%
Divorced or separated	7%	4%	4%
Widowed	16.5%	21%	14%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Household Size and Composition


Table 3 Household Size

	Railway	TA (Regular)	TA (Irregular)
	(n= 91)	(n=68)	(n=28)
Mean Household size			
Mean (<i>Standard deviation</i>)	5.7 (<i>sd</i> =2.385)	6.07 (<i>sd</i> =3.383)	4.96 (<i>sd</i> =1.856)
Median	6	5	5
Grouped number of Household members			
1-4	37%	40%	43%
5-7	45%	29%	50%
≥ 8	18%	31%	7%
Total	100%	100%	100%

The TA (Regular) Households appear to be larger than the TA (Irregular) Households and larger than the average for Phnom Penh, which according to the 2008 Census is 5.1 (National Institute of Statistics, 2008, p. 25) but smaller than Railway Households. There appears to be greater variation in the size of the Households amongst TA (Regular) respondents with a much larger standard deviation and a higher proportion of Households with equal to, or more than 8 Household members.

Age breakdowns of the Households in the three groups are similar, but there is a slightly higher proportion of children aged under 5 years in TA (Regular) (18%) and fully 47% of Household members in the TA (Regular) group are aged 20 or under, suggesting that the demand for both primary and secondary level education is likely to continue to be a priority for the community over the coming years. Moreover, almost 50% of those bearing the brunt of any resettlement-related impoverishment are likely to be children and young people.

Figure 1 Age of Household Members (Grouped)




Respondents' Education Levels

Education levels are likely to have an impact on a Household's ability to understand and cope with the process of resettlement. Not only are Households with lower levels of education more likely to struggle to understand resettlement-related documentation, asymmetries in information may adversely impact their decision-making processes, and hinder their bargaining capacity (Cernea, 2003). In addition, individuals with limited formal education, skills, and training may face particular challenges finding, and adapting to, new income earning activities.

Of the Railway Residents, 76% of the respondents stated that they were literate ('able to read and write'), compared with 75% of the TA (Regular) respondents and 71% of TA (Irregular) respondents. Levels of schooling attained were also similar between the three groups; amongst Railway Residents, 51% of respondents had either no schooling or had only received some primary education, against 26% who had either completed secondary school, or studied further than secondary school. For TA (Regular), the figures were 49% and 21% respectively, and for the TA (Irregular), the figures were 57% and 28% respectively. In addition there is no significant difference between the levels of schooling attained between respondents in the three groups ($p=0.607$).

Figure 2 Levels of Schooling Attained by Respondents



Documentation


Possession of relevant documentation has an impact on Household members' abilities to prove their identity and therefore access a wide range of services such as health care, education, and microfinance. All Households appear to be fairly well documented although 97% of TA (Regular) and 100% of TA (Irregular) Households state that their Family Book is not registered at their new address, which may potentially complicate their ability to access important services. The vast majority of Households said that they had not yet attempted to update their Family Books, and it would be useful if this process could be facilitated without further delay.

Table 4 Household Identification Documentation

Type of documentation	Railway (n=90)	TA (Regular) (n=68)	TA (Irregular) (n=28)
National ID card	94%	90%	93%
Voter ID card	96%	96%	93%
Birth Certificate	97%	97%	89%
Family Book	97%	90%	93%


Vulnerability

Figure 3 Gender of Head of Household



Left to right: Railway (n=91), TA (Regular) (n=68), and TA (Irregular) (n=28)

Figure 4 Head of Household Aged 65 and Older



Left to right: Railway (n=91), TA (Regular) (n=68), and TA (Irregular) (n=28)

29% of Households in the TA (Regular) group are headed by females. This figure appears to be higher than the other respondent groups and higher than the national average in the 2008 Census of 25.6% (National Institute of Statistics, 2009). It is important to note that a larger proportion of female headed Households, combined with a relatively large number of children and young people may increase the dependency ratios and vulnerability of Households in the TA (Regular) group. The feminisation of poverty on resettlement sites is a common phenomenon, and although the Updated Resettlement Plan for the Phnom Penh Section (2010) highlighted specific measures to ensure that vulnerable Households received additional protection and support, it may be necessary to re-evaluate whether Households did actually benefit from these provisions and determine whether additional support might be required. This also applies to the small minority of Households headed by someone aged 65 and above.

4.3. Key findings

- There are no significant differences between the overall Household demographics of the three groups. However, the TA (Regular) group does contain a higher number of widows and female-headed Households, as well as a larger amount of children in bigger Households than the two other groups. As such, TA (Regular) Households potentially have lower earning capacities and may be more vulnerable
- 47% of Household members in the TA (Regular) group are aged 20 or under. As a result, almost half of those bearing the brunt of any resettlement-related impoverishment are likely to be children and young people
- Almost all TA (Regular) and TA (Irregular) Households state that their Family Books are not registered at their new address. This may complicate their ability to access services.
- Given the high number (29%) of female-headed Households in the TA (Regular) feminisation of poverty at the relocation site is of concern

4.4. Recommendations

- Project partners should facilitate the registration of individual and Household documentation, such as Voter ID Cards and Family Books, for TA (Regular) and TA (Irregular) Households as soon as possible, and at a minimum ahead of the National Elections scheduled for July 2013, to ensure no one is disenfranchised as a result of relocation under the Project. This should not result in additional costs for Affected Households.
- Interventions at Trapeang Anhchanh should be tailored to women and children to counter the feminisation of poverty and impacts of resettlement-related impoverishment on children and young people in particular

5

FROM LANDLESSNESS TO LAND-BASED RESETTLEMENT

5.1. Introduction

Cernea believes that the success of a resettlement project often depends primarily on the resolution of land and employment issues (Cernea, 2000). The loss of land is a key feature of many resettlement projects, however. The focus on land-based resettlement in the resettlement literature and many resettlement plans suggests a greater understanding of the dynamics of large development projects in rural areas, where Households predominantly derive their incomes from their land. The loss of land in such circumstances results in the loss of productive systems and an economic base. For urban Households, however, the relationship between land and income generation is more nuanced; while land may not be used for productive purposes, location may play a key role in determining access to services and income generation, particularly for street vendors and home-based entrepreneurs.

There appears to have been a lack of in-depth appreciation of this fact and fundamental inconsistencies lie at the heart of the Updated Resettlement Plan. The location of the Project-sponsored resettlement site is approximately 20km by road from Phnom Penh, making the commute into the city for individuals earning a few dollars a day unviable. At the same time, the plots of land received by Affected Households were only 7mx15m, making farming and foraging above a barely subsistence level equally unviable. Yet some of the activities outlined in the Income Restoration Plan were agricultural in nature, such as chicken rearing and mushroom farming. Such activities are unlikely to build on the existing skillsets of the largely urban labour force.

It must be stressed, therefore, that although the land-based resettlement offered by this project is to be welcomed, the location and quality of the land is also of vital importance. In the DMS, Affected Households stated that living 'close to a market' and 'close to the city' were key priorities (Ministry of Public Works and Transport, 2010, p. 14). Yet it is clear that these were not met, and that the decisions and justifications around the choice of location for the Project-sponsored resettlement site were opaque, ill-informed and apparently subject to limited questioning or oversight from Project donors.

5.2. Findings

Land Ownership

The RGC should be commended for its commitment to providing all Fully Affected Households with a plot of land and subsequently a land title, irrespective of their tenure status along the railway track. This appears to be the main benefit associated with the Resettlement Plan, and provides security of tenure to

some of the poorest and most vulnerable Households in Phnom Penh, during a phase of rapid development and increased volatility and speculation in land markets in the city. It is important to note, however, that Involuntary Resettlement Safeguards Policies have long mandated that Households that do not possess a formal legal title should not be excluded from the compensation process (ADB, 1995, p. 10). In addition, granting land to untenured Households facing development-induced resettlement is a relatively common practice in Cambodia.

Table 5 Household Documentation of Land Possession

	Railway	TA (Regular)	TA (Irregular)
	(n=91)	(n=68)	(n=28)
Yes	62%	12%	71%
Yes but not in current possession	10%	88%	29%
No never had one	24%	-	-
No lost it	4%	-	-
Total	100%	100%	100%

Households in the TA (Regular) and TA (Irregular) groups are much more likely to possess land ownership documentation than Railway Households (100% as opposed to 72%), although among TA (Regular) Households, 88% do not currently possess their documentation, often because it is being held as collateral by informal money lenders (Sahmakum Teang Tnaut, 2012). The figures above over-represent the situation for the Railway residents, however, as the types of documentation that these Households possess afford them no legal claims to land ownership given that their homes are located in the railway's Right of Way (ROW). In contrast, 100% of TA (Regular) and TA (Irregular) Households possess formal occupancy support letters from the local authorities in Trapeang Anhchanh. These are commonly known as land receipts, and while they are not full titles, they formally acknowledge occupancy and ownership of land. Significantly, however, unlike land titles, land receipts are not be used as collateral for loans and the rights contained in the receipts cannot be transferred or sold.

Despite their lack of legal possession rights, the Updated Resettlement Plan for the Phnom Penh Section (2010) guarantees that partially affected Railway Residents are secure in their homes along the tracks for at least a further five years. However, no official documents appears to have been issued to this effect, and discussions with Partially Affected Households reveal that they perceive that there is considerable uncertainty around their future.

Issuance of Land Titles

The Updated Resettlement Plan is somewhat ambiguous with regards to the issuance of land titles to relocated households. In the body of the main document, conditionality is attached to the receipt of a land title; Households must '...stay in the home plot for 5 consecutive years' in order to receive the full title (Ministry of Public Works and Transport, 2010, p. 12). The full entitlement matrix in Annex 1, however, states that 'Households will get their land title certificates (in the names of both husband and wife, if married) as soon as possible if the plots are given at no cost to AHs or at the completion of payment of property' (Ministry of Public Works and Transport, 2010, p. 3 (Annex)). In practice Affected Households are aware that they are obliged to reside in the Trapeang Anhchanh site for five years, loosely following Sub-Decree #19 on Social Land Concessions, although they have never officially received or signed paperwork to this effect.

Table 6 Types of Land Ownership Documentation

	Railway	TA (Regular)	TA (Irregular)
	(n=75)	(n=72)	(n=28)
	% of cases	% of cases	% of cases
Certificate (land title) from the National Government	-	-	-
Official land title investigation paper	-	-	-
Official land title application paper	15%	-	-
Occupancy letter (land receipt) from the Local Authority	7%	100%	100%
Transaction letter signed by the Local Authority	85%	-	-
Transaction letter not signed by the Local Authority	2%	-	-
Other	-	6%	-
Don't know/not sure	3%	-	-
Total	112%	106%	100%

(Note: % case responses may total more than 100%)

This raises two important issues. Firstly, it is not unusual for the RGC to promise resettled Households land titles after five years of residency, but fail to actually provide the document after the five year period has elapsed. Recent research by STT details that this has been a frequent occurrence in a variety of resettlement events over the last decade; out of 47 sites established before or in 2007, only 14 have undergone systematic land registration and/or titling. Among the untitled sites aged five years or more, is Trapeang Anhchanh Chas, the site adjacent to Trapeang Anhchanh (Sahmakum Teang Tnaut, 2012). At present, Affected Households at Trapeang Anhchanh possess a simple land receipt, but no official commitment or details of the process regarding the issuance of a land title from the RGC.

Secondly, this research has highlighted that a significant minority of Fully Affected Households are only irregularly resident in the Project-sponsored resettlement site. It appears that although the majority of these households have claimed their plots at the site through building basic structures on their parcels, when confronted with a move to the city's outskirts their coping strategy has been to make alternative arrangements and continue to live and work in central Phnom Penh, visiting the site at regular intervals. As a result, these Households are most likely not benefiting from the IRP and EIRP. In addition, there are concerns that these Households will be discriminated against when the area is titled, as they may not comply with the condition to 'stay in the home plot for five consecutive years'. Thus they are potentially at risk of losing the central, and most tangible, benefit associated with the resettlement process.

4.3 Key findings

- The allocation of land to Affected Households is arguably the central benefit arising from the resettlement process. However, the remote location of Trapeang Anhchanh undermines the usefulness of the plots, in particular as it does not allow for Affected Households to continue with their previous income-generating activities. The selection of Trapeang Anhchanh as the relocation site also exemplifies disregard for the Affected Households' key priorities, stated as living 'close to a market' and 'close to the city'.
- 100% of TA (Regular) and TA (Irregular) Households possess formal occupancy support letters from the local authorities, acknowledging occupancy and ownership of their plots in Trapeang Anhchanh.
- Despite assurances in the Updated Resettlement Plan for the Phnom Penh Section, Railway Households have received no written guarantees that they are secure in their homes along the tracks for at least five years
- Although it is expected that Households relocated to Trapeang Anhchanh will receive formal land titles to their plots following five years of occupancy, they have received no formal, written commitment to this effect, or any details of the process
- TA (Irregular) Households, who as part of their coping strategy have opted not to live on the site on a permanent basis, may be discriminated against when the area is titled as they may not comply with the condition to 'stay in the home plot for five consecutive years'. As a result they are potentially at risk of losing the central, and most tangible, benefit associated with the resettlement process

4.4 Recommendations

- The RGC should provide each Fully Affected Household with a document detailing the date of, and mechanisms for, the issuance of land titles. Resettlement began in September 2011, and Households should be informed exactly when they will receive their titles. There should be clarity regarding whether titles will be issued as part of the systematic land registration process, or through a separate mechanism. If there are conditions attached to this process, these should be clearly explained and documented. Project donors should ensure that the RGC fulfils its commitment to issue land titles.
- The RGC should commit to issuing land titles to Fully Affected Households that fall under both the TA (Regular) and the TA (Irregular) groups. This report will outline that there was a failure to mitigate key risks inherent in the resettlement process and that many Fully Affected Households are significantly worse off as a result of resettlement. TA (Irregular) Households which, for multiple and valid reasons, may not comply with the condition to stay for five consecutive years in the Project-sponsored resettlement site should not be penalised for their coping strategy, and should receive their land titles.
- The RGC should provide assurances to Households remaining in the railways Right of Way, that they are secure in their homes up until such a time when the land is required for further development of the railways. Such an assurance could take the form of granting usufruct rights to the Households e.g. through the Circular 03 mechanism.

6 FROM JOBLESSNESS TO RE-EMPLOYMENT

6.1. Introduction

Maintaining or restoring an Affected Household's ability to earn an income is central to the success of any resettlement process. Cernea stresses that all other aspects of resettlement are dependent on the restoration of livelihoods (Cernea, 2000) and that this process often takes longer and is more challenging than planners anticipate, particularly when Affected Households are poor and may contain members with limited education or skills. Not only did this Project result in Households moving away from existing jobs, contacts and networks, it also forced them to adapt their skills to a much less varied and dynamic, peri-urban labour market. The shift from urban food and labour markets to peri-urban and semi-rural productive systems will inevitably present significant challenges for urban Households. The Updated Resettlement Plan details the occupations of Heads of Households prior to resettlement. If, however, Household members are unable to use their existing skills in their new locations, '...human capital is rendered lost or obsolete' (Cernea, 2000, p. 26). Prolonged periods of unemployment may lead to a loss of confidence and further de-skilling.

Table 7 Main Source of Livelihood of Head of Household Prior to Relocation

Type of Income Earning Activity	Number of Affected Households
Salary and wage	41
Seller and business	50
Construction worker	21
Taxi driver	1
Transportation work	1
Moto driver	31
None	16
Total	161

(Ministry of Public Works and Transport, 2010, p. 17)

Although the Updated Resettlement Plan for the Phnom Penh Section predicts that the area around the Project-sponsored resettlement site 'will be an axis of industrial development in the future', it also acknowledges that 'the main challenge for the relocating AHs is the possibility to get jobs at the new location. The cost of commuting to the city will be high so AHs [can] not go back to their former jobs once relocated' (Ministry of Public Works and Transport, 2010, p. 15). Yet the measures outlined in the Plan

to mitigate the risk of unemployment are wholly inadequate for a number of reasons. Firstly, a detailed analysis of the potential challenges for Affected Households is absent from the Plan, and there is no recognition of the lessons learned from previous resettlements to similar peri-urban locations around Phnom Penh, which have resulted in high levels of unemployment. Secondly, there is no commitment to investigate the dynamics of the local labour market in and around the area of the Project-sponsored resettlement site, in order that comprehensive and market-focused strategies for income restoration can be designed accordingly. Thirdly, the sole direct measure aimed at mitigating loss of income as a result of resettlement, namely the provision of living allowances to relocating Households, appears to have been implemented incorrectly or selectively, to the effect that Affected Households are likely to have received a lower amount in living allowances than they were entitled to under the Updated Resettlement Plan (Sahmakum Teang Tnaut, 2011). Finally, as noted in the previous section, it appears many of the income-restoration activities outlined in the Resettlement Plan were agricultural in nature, and as such not suited for an urban labour force, nor small 7x15m plots.




In order to have a greater chance of success, income restoration programmes (IRPs) should commence prior to resettlement, and the Updated Resettlement Plan mandates that the IRP 'will have to be implemented before the relocation of AHs' (Ministry of Public Works and Transport, 2010, p. 15). Yet the IRP did not commence until after resettlement had occurred, when a downward spiral of impoverishment and debt was already impacting upon the lives of Affected Households. The EIRP was established in November 2011 following the failure of the IRP to restore incomes. Moreover the combined components of the IRP and EIRP fail to fundamentally address the issue of unemployment. The Self-Help Groups which were established in 2012, although a potentially useful savings mechanism and more recently a source of small grants and loans, will not replace a Household's lost revenue stream. Skills training schemes are only effective if they respond to labour market demand and result in actual employment (Ministry of Public Works and Transport, 2010). Loans for business start-ups may be effective for Households which are keen to run their own businesses, but do not provide a solution for more risk-averse Households whose members have a preference for salaried or waged employment. In addition, in light of the financial constraints that Affected Households on the Project-sponsored resettlement site are currently facing, and their constrained purchasing power, even experienced business owners might have valid concerns about the viability of establishing a new business in the Trapeang Anhchanh location, and may for various reasons be unable to establish a business elsewhere.

Given the factors outlined above, it should not be a surprise that one of the primary outcomes of the resettlement process appears to be increased unemployment and reduced incomes amongst fully Affected Households.

6.2. Findings


89% of Railway Households and 73% of TA (Irregular) Households only had to travel between 0 and 5km to reach their workplaces in 2012. As predicted in the Updated Resettlement Plan, TA (Regular) Households had to commute a considerable (and expensive) distance to work each day; in 2012 only 16% were travelling 0-5km, while 49% were travelling 20km or further.

Figure 5 Distance to Work in 2011 and 2012



It is therefore not surprising that 57% of TA (Regular) Households contain someone who has lost their job between 2011 and 2012, compared with 12% of Railway Households and 14% of TA (Irregular) Households. Unemployment can be caused by a wide range of factors, but the far lower levels of unemployment, as well the similarity in the levels, amongst the Railway and TA (Irregular) Households suggests that the resettlement is likely to have been a key driver of unemployment amongst TA (Regular) Households, and that the TA (Irregular) Households' decision to remain in Phnom Penh is justified on these grounds. It is likely that some TA (Regular) income earners simply opted out of the labour market as a result of resettlement; daily transportation costs would have made some low-paid jobs unviable.

Figure 6 Percentage of Households Containing a Household Member Who Has Lost a Job in 2011-2012



Left to right: Railway (n=91), TA (Regular) (n=68), and TA (Irregular) (n=28)

Despite commitments in the Updated Resettlement Plan to women receiving priority employment in Project construction work and on the railway itself once operations commence, 62% of those who lost their jobs in TA (Regular) Households were women.

The unemployment figures correspond with data on the number of income earners; amongst TA (Regular) Households the mean number of income earners has reduced significantly. In contrast, there has been only a minimal change amongst TA (Irregular) Households and Railway Households.

Table 8 Mean Number of Income Earners per Household in 2011 and 2012


	Railway		TA (Regular)		TA (Irregular)	
	(n=91)		(n=68)		(n=28)	
	2011	2012	2011	2012	2011	2012
Mean number of income earners per Household	2.58	2.63	2.57	2.00	2.00	1.96

Data on individual incomes of Household members was collected through interviews with Household representatives. As a result STT recognises that there may be limitations to the accuracy of this data. Nevertheless, the data presented does, combined with available Household-level data on incomes presented elsewhere in the report, raise concerns regarding deterioration in resettled Households income earning abilities.

In particular, individual incomes for TA (Regular) residents who are working appear to have declined; in


2011, only 23% of income earners in the community earned less than US\$75 per month; in 2012 this figure had risen to 46%; when this figure is combined with the percentage of income earners earning US\$76-US\$150 the cumulative percentage earning less than US\$150 per month is 89%. The incomes of the TA (Irregular) residents also appear to have declined; in 2011 only 38% of income earners earned less than US\$75 per month, and in 2012 this figure had increased to 45%. 86% earned less than US\$150, compared with 80% of Railway residents.

Figure 7 Individual Incomes in 2011



Railway (n=234), TA (Regular) (n=175), and TA (Irregular) (n=59)

Figure 8 Individual Incomes in 2012



Railway (n=235), TA (Regular) (n=137), and TA (Irregular) (n=57)

Both Railway and TA (Irregular) residents earned a median income of just \$100 per month in 2011, with TA (Regular) residents earning slightly more at US\$113. In 2012, the median income for the Railway Residents was constant at US\$100 per month, but the median income for both TA (Regular) and TA (Irregular) had fallen to US\$80 per month.

The fact that the declines in median income for both TA (Regular) and TA (Irregular) residents are quite similar is difficult to explain, given that one would assume that TA (Regular) residents would experience a greater negative impact. It appears that female income earners amongst TA (Irregular) residents have been adversely affected, whereas the incomes of men have remained constant. Among TA (Regular) Households the median incomes of both men and women have experienced similar, large declines of US\$22 and US\$20 per month respectively. In both instances women earned less than men originally, and this fact appears to have been further cemented by the reduction in amounts earned between 2011 and 2012.

Table 9 Mean and Median Individual Incomes of Men and Women in 2011 and 2012 (\$/month)

Gender		Railway		TA (Regular)		TA (Irregular)	
		(n=234)	(n=235)	(n=175)	(n=137)	(n=59)	(n=57)
		2011	2012	2011	2012	2011	2012
Male	Mean	140	139	153	104	141	134
	Median	113	113	120	98	113	113
Female	Mean	116	116	138	100	117	100
	Median	100	100	100	80	81	75
Total	Mean	127	126	146	102	130	118
	Median	100	100	113	80	100	80

6.3. Key Findings

- TA (Regular) Households' employment levels have been negatively affected by the relocation to Trapeang Anhchanh. 57% of TA (Regular) Households contain someone who has lost their job since resettlement, compared with 12% of Railway Households and 14% of TA (Irregular) Households.
- Of TA (Regular) Households remaining in employment, 49% report travelling over 20km to work - a significant cost affecting net income. It is therefore likely that some TA (Regular) income earners simply opted out of the labour market; daily transportation costs from the resettlement site would have made some low-paid jobs unviable.
- Women in the TA (Regular) group appear to have become more economically marginalised following relocation: 62% of those who lost their jobs in TA (Regular) Households were women despite assurances in the Resettlement Plan for priority employment for women.
- Despite the limitations of this data, TA (Regular) incomes appear to have declined: The percentage of income earners earning less than US\$75 per month increased from 23% to 46% between 2011 and 2012; after resettlement, 89% of all TA (Regular) income earners earned less than US\$150 per month.

- TA (Irregular) Households also appear to have experienced a decline in incomes following relocation. Women's incomes in particular declined, while the amounts that men earned remained relatively constant. However, in contrast to TA (Regular) Households, those opting not to live at Trapeang Anhchanh experienced limited job loss, suggesting that resettlement is likely to have been a key driver of unemployment amongst TA (Regular) Households, and that the TA (Irregular) Households' decision to remain in Phnom Penh is justified on these grounds.
- In contrast to TA (Regular) and TA (Irregular) Households, incomes and employment levels of the Railway Households saw minimal change over 2011-2012. This suggests that the declines in income and employment experienced by particularly TA (Regular), but also TA (Irregular) are resettlement related.

6.4. Recommendations

- Project donors together with the RGC should conduct a review of the living allowances received by all Affected Households in order to ensure all Households received the correct living allowance as per the Updated Resettlement Plan. Should it be found that a Household did not receive the correct living allowance, additional compensation should be provided.
- IRP/EIRP implementers and project partners should enhance transparency and communication regarding the IRP/EIRP, and better coordinate with relevant agencies and NGOs. Regular monitoring reports by an independent monitor (i.e. not IRP implementer SBK) should be publicly disclosed.
- The IRP/EIRP should move away from activities, such as chicken raising and mushroom growing, that can only raise living standards to subsistence level, and instead focus on assisting Household members to gain secure employment
- IRP/EIRP implementers and project partners should conduct an in-depth analysis of local labour market conditions. In consultation with Project Affected People, this analysis should inform the development of the EIRP, to ensure that it is both market-focused and that it builds on the existing strengths, interests and skill sets of Project Affected People.
- IRP/EIRP implementers should consider employing a Liaison Officer who is responsible for building relationships with potential employers located close to the Project-sponsored resettlement site on behalf of Project Affected People, and matching them with potential employers. This role might also include a mandate to offer incentives to local employers who are able provide stable and decent work to Project Affected People.
- Project partners should consider providing some form of shared transportation for residents in the Project-sponsored resettlement site. This could take the form of covering the capital costs for the purchase of a minibus, for example. Project Affected People could negotiate potential routes and schedules, and the driver could be a Project Affected Person. This could provide Households with a cost-effective, sustainable means of commuting to the city for work.

- The IRP/EIRP should be extended to all adult Household members. Urban Households in Cambodia almost always contain more than one income earner per Household and restricting access does not help to solve the Households' overall financial challenges, and
- The IRP/EIPR implementers should ensure that contact is maintained with TA (Irregular) Households and that Households are kept informed of the opportunities available to them under the IRP/EIRP.
- The IRP/EIRP implementers and Project partners should follow up on commitments made in the Updated Resettlement Plan for the Phnom Penh Section pertaining to priority employment for Affected Households on Project-related construction work during implementation, and for railway company jobs once the railway is operational (Ministry of Public Works and Transport, 2010, p. 16).
- If new community infrastructure is to be constructed in the Project-sponsored resettlement site, Project Affected People should receive priority consideration for employment in the construction work.
- If skills training programmes are to continue, these should match realistic income-generation opportunities in the area, and successful completion of the training should entitle participants to receive equipment related to their skill and a start-up grant (e.g. through the Community Development Fund), and/or a work placement.

7

FROM HOMELESSNESS TO HOUSE RECONSTRUCTION

7.1. Introduction

The destruction of the houses of Project Affected People, and their subsequent reconstruction elsewhere, is perhaps the most tangible aspect of any resettlement process. Mitigating impoverishment risks and providing and promoting improved shelter conditions for Project Affected Households is, however, relatively straight-forward to achieve, provided that there is ‘...fair recognition of housing reconstruction costs in the displacing project’s budget’ (Cernea, 2000, p. 39).

The Updated Resettlement Plan for the Phnom Penh Section allowed for compensation for Affected Households’ structures to be calculated at replacement cost, as opposed to market value, meaning that the amounts received would theoretically have been sufficient to replace a Households’ lost housing materials at 2011 prices. The replacement cost methodology is preferable to a strict market value methodology, as market value compensation would have resulted in Households with basic, very old and/or dilapidated structures almost certainly receiving far less. Yet a combination of factors outlined below meant that levels of compensation paid for the loss of a house as part of the Project were often not sufficient to build a new house, and poor planning for the process of house reconstruction, combined with a lack of advice for Affected Households, has had a huge impact on Households’ well-being since resettlement and resulted in an increased burden of debt.

Research previously conducted by STT found that there had been a lack of transparency in the process of measuring houses and calculating Affected Households’ compensation amounts, a systematic downgrading of the type of house structure, and an undervaluation of the structure’s floor space, resulting in Households often receiving less compensation than they were entitled to (Sahmakum Teang Tnaut, 2011). The findings has been substantiated by the awarding of additional compensation to individual Affected Households following complaints to ADB’s Office of the Special Project Facilitator (OSPF). However, STT’s research also noted that even if Affected Households had received the correct amount of compensation based on the Updated Resettlement Plan, the total amounts of compensation remained inadequate for successful resettlement outcomes; the average amount of total structure compensation for 96 Fully Affected Households surveyed was only US\$1050 (Sahmakum Teang Tnaut, 2011).

In addition, there is strong evidence in the resettlement literature that resettled Households often aspire to improve their physical living standards. They are willing to borrow money, mobilise family labour, use compensation that was intended for their productive assets, and make continued incremental investments in order to construct better quality homes. This may be in the form of increased floor area, higher quality housing materials, and connection to utilities and sanitation (Cernea, 2000, p. 39). The desire for improved quality housing may be particularly strong when Affected Households are poor and their existing housing is inadequate. Bridges Across Borders Cambodia argues convincingly that when Affected Households’ ‘basic shelters [do] not provide privacy, security, protection from the elements, or enough space for the

family to live in a safe and healthy manner', it is inevitable that the replacement cost methodology will result in inadequate levels of compensation (Bridges Across Borders Cambodia, 2012, p. 28).

Lastly, there was limited recognition of the cost of labour in the Updated Resettlement Plan and it seems to have been assumed that Project Affected People would – and had the skills to – build their own houses and assist their friends and neighbours. As such, while the Resettlement Plan states that replacement cost is 'based on current market prices of materials and labor' (Ministry of Public Works and Transport, 2010, p. 4), the replacement cost study makes no mention of the cost of labour (Ministry of Public Works and Transport, 2010, pp. 37-39), which one could reasonably expect to differ across house structure types. Conversely Datta & Jones highlight that 'self-housing' is partly a myth as homes are usually constructed by a combination of skilled and unskilled labourers who are paid for their services (Datta & Jones, 2001). Female-headed households and the elderly are particularly disadvantaged if resettled Households are expected to wholly or partly construct their own housing. Labour costs can add a substantial amount to the costs of house construction, as can other associated costs such as the transportation of housing materials and the clearance and levelling of the land. In this context it should be noted that while vulnerable Households were entitled to additional monetary assistance under the Updated Resettlement Plan, the plan also utilised a regressive system of calculation for entitlements, to the effect that households with smaller structures made from lower quality materials prior to resettlement received lower living allowances, reducing their ability to pay for costs associated with the move.

The Updated Resettlement Plan does partly acknowledge and attempt to provide a solution to the issue of house reconstruction, suggesting a potential partnership with Habitat for Humanity, which had previously worked with low income Households to construct new houses, the costs for which were paid off over a long loan term (Ministry of Public Works and Transport, 2010, p. 15). Even prior to the resettlement, however, the Inter-Ministerial Resettlement Committee and project donors were aware that such a partnership would not materialise, but no further solutions were provided in recognition of this fact. The findings of this report indicate that relocated Households spent a significant amount of money on house construction; STT hence believes that the debt acquired by Households as a result of inadequate compensation, planning, and advice is resettlement-related and that the increased debt burden has significantly contributed to the impoverishment of Affected Households.




7.2. Findings

Housing Size and Quality

Despite not having legal ownership rights, Affected Households had lived along the railway tracks in Phnom Penh for many years. While housing type and quality varied immensely, Households were able to build their houses incrementally, making gradual improvements over time.

Figure 9 Number of Years Resident Along the Railway Tracks



Railway (n=91), TA (Regular) (n=67), and TA (Irregular) (n=28)

The nature of the resettlement process meant that fully Affected Households had to construct their new houses quickly, usually within 1-2 months, in order to avoid homelessness. TA (Regular) Households spent a median amount of US\$1,850 to construct their houses, in contrast to the US\$700 spent by TA (Irregular) residents, many of whom built only a small structure on the Project-sponsored resettlement site, but continued to live elsewhere. 20 out of 28 TA (Irregular) Households now rent accommodation, and the remaining 8 live in accommodation that is 'not owned but not rented', most likely with relatives or friends. Railway Households estimated that they had spent a median amount of US\$3,750 constructing their houses. While it is difficult to verify this figure as the investment was incremental over many years, it suggests that while some TA (Regular) Households may have attempted to upgrade their living standards in line with Cernea's prediction, it is also possible that the amount spent by TA (Regular) residents is still lower than the long-term amounts they invested in their homes over the years since moving to the railway. It is certainly true, however, that TA (Regular) Households have significantly increased the sizes of their houses since resettlement; the mean house size has nearly doubled to 42 m². As most fully Affected Households lived closest to the tracks where there was limited room to extend their houses, it is perhaps not surprising that they have aspired to provide more space for their families following resettlement.

Table 10 Mean and Median House Sizes Before and After Resettlement

	Railway	TA (Regular)		TA (Irregular)	
	Sept/Oct 2012	Before resettlement	After resettlement	Before resettlement	After resettlement (current residence – not TA)
	(n=89)	(n=67)	(n=67)	(n=28)	(n=19)
Mean size of house (m²)	54	23	42	25	25
Median size of house (m²)	42	16	32	17	20

Upgrading housing materials is a common response to resettlement but although there are a number of examples of Affected Households who have clearly invested in much more permanent and expensive structures than they would previously have been accustomed to, the findings on housing quality are mixed. It appears on the one hand that TA (Regular) Households have invested in ensuring that their walls are constructed from concrete, brick or stone, or high quality mixed materials, but 34% still use metal sheets. A higher proportion of TA (Regular) Households have an earth or clay floor following resettlement (29% as opposed to 17.5% before resettlement), which is often associated with poverty, but may also be a sign of an incremental building approach. Both before and after resettlement, there is a strong preference in all communities for roofs to be constructed from metal sheets.

Table 11 Material Used for Floor Construction Before and After Resettlement

	Railway	TA (Regular)		TA (Irregular)	
	Sept/Oct 2012	Before resettlement	After resettlement	Before resettlement	After resettlement (current residence – not TA)
	(n=91)	(n=68)	(n=68)	(n=28)	(n=28)
Earth/clay	14.5%	17.5%	29%	25%	14%
Wood/logs	27.5%	31%	16%	29%	36%
Brick/concrete / stone	35%	28%	40%	32%	25%
Ceramic tiles	23%	23.5%	15%	14%	25%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 12 Number of Floors Before and After Resettlement

	Railway	TA (Regular)		TA (Irregular)	
	Sept/Oct 2012	Before resettlement	After resettlement	Before resettlement	After resettlement
	(n=91)	(n=68)	(n=68)	(n=28)	Not available
One floor on the ground	14%	19%	54.5%	25%	N/a
One floor on stilts	53%	57.5%	38%	39%	N/a
Two floors	33%	23.5%	7.5%	36%	N/a
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	N/a

Table 13 Material Used for Wall Construction Before and After Resettlement

	Railway	TA (Regular)		TA (Irregular)	
	Sept/Oct 2012	Before resettlement	After resettlement	Before resettlement	After resettlement (current residence – not TA)
	(n=91)	(n=68)	(n=68)	(n=28)	(n= 28)
Thatch/leaves/grass	-	1.5%	1%	3.5%	-
Wood/logs/bamboo	46%	32.5%	9%	28.5%	28.6%
Metal sheets	11%	34%	34%	39%	32.1%
Concrete/brick/stone	21%	4%	31%	14%	32.1%
Low quality mixed material	6%	6%	-	4%	3.6%
High quality mixed material	16%	22%	25%	11%	3.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Access to Service and Utilities

According to the Updated Resettlement Plan for the Phnom Penh Section, water supply or well water, and access to electricity would be provided free of charge prior to relocation. The plan states a sum of US\$50,000 had been reserved for this purpose. (Ministry of Public Works and Transport, 2010, p. 14) In contrast to other relocation sites, provision of access was completed prior to relocation which sets a positive precedent for future resettlements. Affected Households nevertheless had to pay a deposit for connections to individual houses, which seems to have caused some delays. It appears that at least part of this amount was later reimbursed.

Relocation to Trapeang Anhchanh has resulted in improved access to state electricity for TA (Regular) Households, with 69% of TA (Regular) Households versus 51% of Railway Households having a direct connection to the state electricity provider, Electricité du Cambodge (EDC). In addition, 25% of TA (Regular) Households share an EDC connection with a friend or a neighbour. A similar percentage (23%) of Railway Households also share a connection, while a quarter purchases electricity from a middle man, which often results in increased prices. This is partly reflected in the higher mean and median costs for electricity among Railway Households, as well as TA (Irregular) Households living near their former locations, in contrast to TA (Regular) Households who pay the EDC's standard prices.

The positive impacts of resettlement in terms of access to utilities are further evidenced with regards to access to water through the Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority (PPWSA). A clear majority (91%) of TA (Regular) Households are connected to PPWSA water, compared to only 27.5% of Railway Households, who in the main rely on shared connections (72.5%). Similarly to electricity costs, mean and median costs for water are significantly lower in the TA (Regular) group that enjoys PPWSA water; costs for both the Railways and TA (Irregular) Households are more than double PPWSA rates.

Table 14 Access to an Electricity Connection

	Railway (n=91)	TA (Regular) (n=68)	TA (Irregular)
Yes, state connection (EDC)	51%	69%	Data not available
Yes, connection supplied by middleman	26%	-	
Yes, connection shared with a friend or neighbour	23%	25%	
No, previously had but disconnected	-	3%	
No, never had a connection	-	3%	
Total	100%	100%	

Table 15 Median Cost of Electricity (Riels/KWh)


	Railway (n=91)	TA (Regular) (n=28)	TA (Irregular) (n=63)
Mean	1122	764	1286
Median	1100	610	1350

Table 16 Access to a Piped Water Connection

	Railway	TA (Regular)	TA (Irregular)
	(n=91)	(n=68)	
Yes, PPWSA connection	27.5%	91%	Data not available
Yes, connection supplied by middleman	-		
Yes, connection shared with a friend or neighbour	72.5%	7.5%	
No, previously had but disconnected	-		
No, never had one	-	1.5%	
Total	100%	100%	

Table 17 Median Cost of Water (Riels/Cubic Metre)

	Railway	TA (Regular)	TA (Irregular)
	(n=91)	(n=67)	(n=26)
Mean	1671	686	1512
Median	1700	650	1500

Figure 10 Access to Toilet Facilities

The clear majority (93%) of TA (Regular) have access to pour or flush toilets which flow to the sewerage or a septic tank, resulting from the fact that one toilet was built on each plot on the site prior to resettlement. Among Railway Households only 70% have access to flush toilets connected to either sewerage or septic

tanks, the equivalent number for TA (Irregular) Households is 86%. It appears, therefore, that resettlement has had a positive effect on Households' access to sanitation facilities.

Resettlement Related Debt

In April 2012 STT conducted in-depth interviews with 12 TA (Regular) Households who were experiencing problems of acute indebtedness. While Households had acquired debt both as a short-term coping strategy and in order to make long-term investments, the predominant reason for indebtedness appeared to be linked to house reconstruction. Prior to resettlement the RGC and Project donors had provided Affected Households with no '...feasible options for accessing housing finance or advice regarding debt management prior to relocation, or immediately after. This was in spite of the fact that, in light of their precarious situations and low incomes, it was unlikely that banks and Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) would consider them to be viable borrowers' (Sahmakum Teang Thaut, 2012, p. 3). STT's report concluded that:

The combined effects of inadequate compensation, a dearth of practical advice, reduced incomes resulting from lack in income-generating opportunities and unsustainable and spiralling levels of debt means that just eight months after resettlement, Households in Trapeang Anhchanh are severely overdue with their interest repayments, and are facing regular intimidation from informal lenders. There is a distinct risk that some Households will default on their loans and lose their homes and their land.

(Sahmakum Teang Thaut, 2012, p. 3)

Although STT believed that the data collected was evidence of a wider, systematic problem facing Fully Affected Households, the relatively small number of Households interviewed and the lack of a comparison group made it difficult to make broader generalisations about the findings, or infer that the debt was the consequence of structural problems with the resettlement process. It is certainly true that indebtedness is a common problem in Cambodia; research conducted by the Access to Finance Consortium (A2F) in 2011 following widespread flooding in Cambodia found that even prior to the floods, 63% of Households in surveyed areas had an outstanding debt. 11% of Households had 2 loans outstanding and 4% of Households had 3 loans outstanding. The average loan size for the first loan was US\$635 (The Access to Finance Consortium, 2012, pp. 12-15). Data from the Cambodian Microfinance Association (CMA) highlights that in the second quarter of 2012, there were 1,197,722 active loans in Cambodia, with an average loan size of US\$609.1 (Cambodian Microfinance Association, 2012). In addition, recent research conducted by the Municipality of Phnom Penh suggests that over 80% of urban poor Households are currently experiencing some level of debt (Municipality of Phnom Penh, 2012).


While it is difficult to make broad comparisons of this data with the data from the survey conducted by STT, the findings that are outlined below do, however, appear to suggest that the propensity for debt is far greater amongst TA (Regular) Households than would be considered normal in other communities in Cambodia, and that the burden of debt is also higher.

The RGC, ADB and AusAID have taken the situation of the indebted Households seriously, and intimidation from informal lenders appears to have lessened or even ceased, as has the immediate risk that Households might lose their plots of land if they default on their loans. Key components of the EIRP are the establishment of a Social Safety Net Fund and the provision of a Community Development Fund for livelihoods activities, through the Self-Help Groups formed under the IRP. Combined, these mechanisms are designed to provide emergency relief for Households experiencing extreme difficulties, assist Households to work together to save money and normalise their finances, and give Households the option to borrow money at low interest

rates to invest in productive activities. These initiatives are very welcome. They nevertheless fail to address that fact that Households have large and unsustainable levels of debt, which they have very little realistic chance of being able to repay, even if Household incomes are gradually restored to pre-resettlement levels. In addition, while Households are preoccupied with making loan principle and interest repayments that they cannot afford, limited funds are diverted from other important Household expenditures such as food, education, health, and savings or business investment. As such, the indebtedness of relocated Households forms an important barrier to the restoration of the livelihoods and living standards of the Affected Households, and, if not solved as a matter of priority, is likely to undermine all and any interventions at Trapeang Anhchanh.


98% of TA (Regular) Households owe money to someone, and 97% of these say that they are struggling to repay their debt. This percentage of indebted Households is significantly higher than amongst both Railway Households (52%) and TA (Irregular) Households (61%). Multiple borrowing also appears to be a greater problem amongst TA (Regular) Households; out of 67 Households with debt, 22 Households have 2 loans outstanding and 5 Households have 3 loans outstanding. By comparison, only 4 Railway Households have 2 loans outstanding, and 1 Household has 3 loans outstanding.

Figure 11 Percentage of Households Who Owe Money to Someone



Left to right: Railway (n=91), TA (Regular) (n=68), and TA (Irregular) (n=28)

Figure 12 Percentage of Indebted Households Facing Challenges Repaying Their Debts



Left to right: Railway (n=47), TA (Regular) (n=67), and TA (Irregular) (n=17)

Table 18 Number of Loans per Household

Number of loans	Railway	TA (Regular)	TA (Irregular)
	(n=53)	(n=99)	(n=18)
	Number of Households		
1	42	40	14
2	4	22	2
3	1	5	0

(Nb. The data for one loan for the TA (Irregular) Households is missing. The total number of loans is 19).


The median loan size amongst TA (Regular) Households is US\$1,000, compared with US\$600 for Railway Households and US\$700 for TA (Irregular) Households. Correspondingly, monthly interest payments for TA (Regular) Households are higher; Households pay a median interest payment of US\$56 per month which is clearly very difficult to manage in light of the fact that gross median Household incomes are just US\$183 per month. Median interest rates are 3.3% per month for Railway Households and 7% per month for TA (Regular) and TA (Irregular) Households.

The higher interest rates paid by Fully Affected Households reflect the fact that the TA (Regular) and TA (Irregular) Households are far more reliant on informal lenders than Railway Households; 73% of loans accessed by TA (Regular) Households originate from informal lenders, against 61% for TA (Irregular) Households and 32% for Railway Households. Indeed, 25% of the loans held by Railway Households originate from a bank, whereas TA (Regular) and (Irregular) Households appear not to have accessed banking services at all. Microfinance Institutions play a negligible role in all three groups; MFIs are likely to feel hesitant about lending to Households who are at risk of resettlement, or who have recently been resettled. Worryingly, only 13% of loans in amongst TA (Regular) Households originate from friends and relatives, compared with 28% and 33% amongst Railway and TA (Irregular) respectively. This appears to be very low and potentially highlights increased economic marginalisation amongst Households in the Project-sponsored resettlement site. In addition to high interest rates, loans from informal lenders are often subject to the compounding of unpaid principle and interest. This means that outstanding loan amounts are often far higher than the figures outlined in the table above (Sahmakum Teang Tnaut, 2012).

Table 19 Mean and Median Original Loan and Outstanding Principal Amounts


	Railway		TA (Regular)		TA (Irregular)	
	(n=53)	(n=41)	(n=99)	(n=97)	(n=18)	(n=18)
	Loan Amount (US\$)	Outstanding Principle (US\$)	Loan Amount (US\$)	Outstanding Principle (US\$)	Loan Amount (US\$)	Outstanding Principle (US\$)
Mean	993	753	1,006	979	1,277	1,244
Median	600	500	1,000	870	700	700

Figure 13 Total Median Monthly Interest Repayments and Monthly Interest Rates



Railway (n=35), TA (Regular) (n=88/92), and TA (Irregular) (n=14)

Figure 14 Loan Source



Railway (n=53), TA (Regular) (n=99), and TA (Irregular) (n=18)


94% of TA (Regular) Households who have borrowed money provided their land receipt as collateral against the loan. This figure supports STT's earlier research into this issue (Sahmakum Teang Tnaut, 2012), and is in line with the large number of Households who have borrowed money from informal lenders. Amongst Railway Households, the most commonly provided form of collateral is an occupancy letter, but 64% of Households who borrowed money provided no collateral. TA (Irregular) Households have also provided land receipts as collateral, but 59% of Households who borrowed money did not provide any collateral, reflecting the higher levels of borrowing from friends/relatives and NGOs.

Table 20 Loan Collateral Provided by Households

Type of collateral	Railway		TA (Regular)		TA (Irregular)	
	(n= 53)	(n= 47)	(n=99)	(n=67)	(n=18)	(n=17)
	% Loans	% HHs	% Loans	% HHs	% Loans	% HHs
Certificate (land title) from the National Government	6%	6%	1%	1%	-	-
Occupancy letter (land receipt) from the Local Authority	2%	2%	64%	94%	44%	47%
Transaction letter	25%	28%	-	-	-	-
National ID	9%	11%	11%	16%	-	-
Family Book	8%	9%	2%	3%	-	-
None	57%	64%	27%	40%	56%	59%
Total	106%	119%	105%	155%	100%	106%

(Nb. This question allowed multiple responses; percentages will total greater than 100%)

Although Households usually borrow money for a number of diverse reasons, the survey requested that Households detail their primary reason for borrowing. 68% of TA (Regular) and 67% of TA (Irregular) Households borrowed money primarily to construct their homes. 9% of TA (Regular) Households borrowed money to pay for food expenses, followed by 5% of Households borrowing for health and 5% to invest in an existing business. 11% of TA (Irregular) Households borrowed money for health reasons, and 11% to invest in an existing business. Amongst Railway Households, home construction was also the major reason for borrowing, although it constituted a far lower proportion (26%), along with investing in an existing or a new business (26% combined), followed by health care (21%), and food expenses (13%). While low income Households commonly borrow for consumption and to smooth their finances, TA (Regular) residents have the lowest levels of borrowing for so-called ‘productive’ purposes, such as business investment or education.

Figure 15 Primary Loan Purpose

7.3. Key findings

- The indebtedness of Fully Affected Households is resettlement-related. It has the potential to seriously undermine the attempts which are currently being made to assist fully Affected Households to restore their livelihoods, as well as efforts to build trust and community cohesion at the Project-sponsored resettlement site.
- The theory that relocated Households aspire to build better housing at their new location appears to hold at least partly true in the case of Households affected by the Project. The survey shows that TA (Regular) Households have built significantly larger houses at Trapeang Anhchanh. However, data on the quality of housing at the site is inconclusive: compared to the homes of Railway Households, it is not evident that TA (Regular) homes are of better or worse quality. In addition, it is not evident that TA (Regular) Households spent more on building their new homes than Railway Households state they have spent incrementally over many years.
- The mean amount (US\$1,850) TA (Regular) Households spent on their new homes is significantly higher than the average compensation of US\$1,050 accorded to 96 Households surveyed by STT in 2011 (Sahmakum Teang Tnaut, 2011).
- Reflecting the fact that TA (Irregular) Households do not reside at Trapeang Anhchanh on a permanent basis, the mean amount spent on house construction at the site by this group is US\$700.
- Households in Trapeang Anhchanh have better access to electricity, water and toilet facilities. The TA (Regular) group also enjoys cheaper utilities, in particular water, than the other groups, by virtue of Trapeang Anhchanh being connected to EDC and PPWSA for power and water respectively.
- TA (Regular) Households are in severe debt, with 98% of Households owing money to someone; 97% of these say that they are struggling to repay their debt. Compared to Railway Households (52%) and TA (Irregular) Households (61%), the level of indebtedness amongst TA (Regular) Households is significant. In addition, Households in the group tend to have more loans and bigger loans than those in the other groups.
- The propensity for debt appears to be greater amongst TA (Regular) Households than would be considered normal in other communities in Cambodia, and the burden of debt is also higher
- Monthly interest rates paid by TA (Regular) Households are significantly higher than those of indebted Railway Households, with a median of 7% compared to 3.3% for Railway Households. This appears mainly to be a result of TA (Regular) Households' loans being from informal moneylenders as opposed to banks or friends and relatives.
- 94% of TA (Regular) Households have provided their land receipts as collateral for their loans from informal moneylenders. In contrast, 64% of indebted Railway Households needed to provide no collateral for their loans. As a result, although it appears measures have been taken to stop informal moneylenders from requisitioning indebted TA (Regular) Households' plots, this remains a concern for the future and indicates how resettlement to Trapeang Anhchanh has contributed to increasing the vulnerability of Affected Households.
- TA (Regular) and TA (Irregular) Households borrowed money primarily for house construction, most likely to bridge the difference between the amounts they were compensated and the cost of rebuilding their homes.

- By comparing other reasons for borrowing money across the three groups, the survey found that TA (Regular) residents have the lowest levels of borrowing for so-called ‘productive’ purposes, such as business investment or education.

7.11. Recommendations

- An in-depth assessment of the debt levels and loan agreements of all Affected Households should be conducted. This data is reportedly already being gathered by CUFA, and should be used to devise Household-specific solutions as outlined below.
- Fully Affected Households should be provided with debt-relief. It is recognised that this issue would have to be managed carefully, so as not to lead to perverse incentives or moral hazards and cause tensions between indebted and non-indebted Households. Given the fact that 67 out of 68 Households currently resident on the Project-sponsored resettlement site are indebted, however, this may not pose a significant problem.
- If full debt relief is not possible, debt restructuring should occur. ADB or AusAID could guarantee a new, low-interest loan, to be administered by a reputable and experienced agency, possibly as a special project. Many existing MFIs may be unable to offer such a product because they do not offer similar products to their existing clients.
 - Households should be provided with an individually tailored long-term, low interest loan, similar to a mortgage loan. It is important that the loan amount, loan term, and repayment schedule is developed according to the individual Household’s monthly repayment capacity (Collins, Morduch, Rutherford, & Ruthven, 2009); Households with higher incomes may be able to make larger repayments and repay the loan more quickly. Households with lower incomes will likely have to repay their loan over many years. Appropriately and individually structured loans will increase the likelihood that the Household will be able to make the repayments as scheduled.
 - Prior to provision of the new loan, comprehensive steps would need to be taken in order to remove the informal moneylenders from the equation. This could take the form of IRC-led negotiations with the moneylenders regarding the terms of the loans to allow Affected Households to repay them at reasonable rates.
 - Provision of this low interest loan could be conditional on indebted Households agreeing to repay informal lenders (either or in part or in full) as a priority, to attend financial literacy training, and to participate in other aspects of the EIRP.
- The RGC together with Project donors should provide support and assistance to Affected Households in any negotiations with informal lenders to ensure no Households lose their plots.
- Given that an additional 105 Households appear to be due to relocate to Trapeang Anhchanh in the near future, care must be taken to ensure that any debt relief or debt restructuring for existing residents does not give rise to a moral hazard, in the sense that the additional Households take on debts with the expectation that these too will be subject to debt relief or restructuring. This risk can be mitigated through meaningful consultation with the 105 Households, adequate compensation to limit the need for loans, provision of access to housing finance and the IRP/EIRP prior to relocation, and robust financial advice and support to relocating Households (as currently provided by CUFA).

8

FROM MARGINALISATION TO SOCIAL INCLUSION

8.1. Introduction

The resettlement process can often compound existing vulnerabilities in poor and marginalised communities and result in a spiral of “downward mobility” (Cernea, 2000, p. 26). The loss of economic power is evident in the systematic downgrading of Households’ economic activities, their assets, and their human capital. Poor and vulnerable Households spend many years slowly and deliberately making investments in human and physical capital and these investments can also translate into increased status and respect within the community. If the resettlement process leads to economic marginalisation, social and psychological marginalisation is a likely consequence. Reduced confidence in oneself and society, heightened feelings of vulnerability, and a strong sense of injustice can all contribute to a loss of motivation and a reduced ability to adapt. According to Cernea, ‘...discouragement strikes deeply at the human ability to recover’ (Cernea, 2003, p. 42). While a minority of Affected Households may possess the resilience necessary to re-establish their lives, for others the scale of the challenge may be overwhelming.


Prior to resettlement, the Project Affected Households were already somewhat marginalised due to their informal housing and locations along the railway tracks. This obscures a more complex and nuanced reality, however. The railway communities were diverse and quite dynamic – many Households ran small businesses along the tracks (which acted as a busy walkway), and improvements to houses and businesses had been made painstakingly over many years. Some Households enjoyed considerable status within the community and possessed greater assets than might be expected in comparable informal settlements in Phnom Penh.

The Updated Resettlement Plan pays very little attention to the marginalisation of Affected Households. Indeed it could be argued that the location of the Project-sponsored resettlement site meant that economic and social marginalisation was embedded in the Plan from the outset.

8.2. Findings

85% of TA (Regular) Households perceive that their overall economic situation has worsened or greatly worsened in the last 12 months. The majority of TA (Irregular) Households also report a worsening, but an almost equal percentage (46%) report that their situation has ‘stayed the same’. The perceptions amongst resettled Households contrast sharply with those of Railway Households; 83% of Railway Households report that their economic situation has ‘stayed the same’ in the last 12 months.

Figure 16 Perceptions of Change in the Household's Overall Economic Situation in the Last 12 Months



Railway (n=91), TA (Regular) (n=68), and TA (Irregular) (n=28)

These perceptions are supported by the figures on Household incomes and expenditures. There was a significant difference in gross Household incomes between 2011 and 2012 for both TA (Regular) and TA (Irregular) Households, with median Household incomes falling from US\$344 to US\$183, and from US\$265 to US\$223, respectively. There was no significant difference in the gross incomes of Railway Households between 2011 and 2012. In addition when a difference in difference analysis was applied, there was a significant difference between the change in income between the TA (Regular) Households and the change in income of the Households in the remaining two groups ($p=0.000$). If it is assumed that the change that occurred amongst Railway and TA (Irregular) Households between 2011 and 2012 is the counterfactual (i.e. what would have happened to the TA (Regular) Households in the absence of resettlement), the fact that there is a significant difference in the change between TA (Regular) and the other two groups suggests that the decline in incomes is linked to the resettlement process. In addition, while underreporting of incomes is a relatively common phenomenon, the relative decline in TA (Regular) Households' incomes only suggests limited underreporting and recall bias.

Table 21 Mean and Median Household Incomes in 2011 and 2012

Group	N	Statistics	Gross monthly Household income (US\$)		
			2011	2012	
Railway	n=91	Mean	324	328	0.7
		Median	275	265	
TA (Regular)	n=68	Mean	372	220	0.00
		Median	344	183	
TA (Irregular)	n=28	Mean	276	240	0.01
		Median	265	223	


The amount and distribution of Household expenses have also changed between 2011 and 2012. Expenses for TA (Regular) Households have significantly decreased between 2011 and 2012 with the median amount

spent falling from US\$264 to US\$229. By comparison, expenses have significantly increased in Railway and TA (Irregular) Households between 2011 and 2012, with median expenses increasing from US\$258 to US\$292 for Railway Households, and from US\$217 to US\$245 for TA (Irregular) Households. Similarly to the income figures there is a significant difference in the change in Household expenses between 2011 and 2012 between TA (Regular) Households and the other 2 groups ($p=0.00$). There is no significant difference in the change in Household expenses between the Railway and TA (Irregular) groups ($p=0.25$). This suggests that the change in expenditures amongst TA (Regular) Households is resettlement-related. Importantly, median monthly Household expenses are greater than monthly incomes for all groups. The deficit is particularly pronounced amongst TA (Regular) Households, however, raising questions about how these Households' will be able to continue to cope with such a large shortfall.

Table 22 Mean and Median Household Expenses in 2011 and 2012

	N	Statistics	Monthly Household expenses (\$)		Significance (2-tailed)
			2011	2012	
Railway	n=91	Mean	269	327	0.00
		Median	258	292	
TA (Regular)	n=68	Mean	283	253	0.02
		Median	264	229	

Figure 17 Percentage Change in Household Expenditures Between 2011 and 2012



Nb. The number of values varies for each budget line in each community. This is because not all Households expend on all budget lines.

Figure 18 Amounts Spent and % Change in Railway Households in 2011 and 2012




Figure 19 Amounts Spent and % Change in TA (Regular) Households in 2011 and 2012





Figure 20 Amounts Spent and % Change in TA (Irregular) Households in 2011 and 2012




Resettled Households' reduced incomes and restructured expenditures also have an impact on their ability to save. Saving is vital for poor Households; even modest savings amounts can provide a safety net during emergencies, and can smooth shocks to Household incomes, ensuring that Households do not have to sell assets or acquire expensive debt in order to cope. Saving also allows Households to plan for, and invest in, their futures.

Between 2011 and 2012, the percentage of Households that were able to save money declined in the Railway and TA (Regular) groups, but increased quite substantially from 29% to 46% amongst TA (Irregular) Households. This is surprising given that TA (Irregular) Households also experienced a significant reduction in incomes in this period.



Figure 21 Percentage of Households Able to Save Money - 2011 and 2012



The amount saved by TA (Regular) and TA (Irregular) Households has declined dramatically, however, to a mean of US\$1 per month in both groups, and a median of US\$2 and US\$2.50 per month respectively. Amongst Railway Households the median amount saved in 2012 was US\$37 per month. This difference between the resettled and non-resettled Households is striking, and provides further evidence to support the argument that Fully Affected Households have become economically marginalised as a result of resettlement.

Table 23 Mean and Median Monthly Savings Amount in 2011 and 2012 (\$/month)

	Railway		TA (Regular)		TA (Irregular)	
	(n=27)	(n=20)	(n=33)	(n=18)	(n=8)	(n=13)
	2011	2012	2011	2012	2011	2012
Mean	47	54	57	2	52	2.5
Median	30	37	38	1	44	1

The findings outlined in this report derive from data which was collected before the Self-Help Groups in the Project-sponsored resettlement site were fully functional, and therefore may under-represent savings activities amongst TA (Regular) Households. The arrival of Social Safety Net grant funds, and Community Development Fund loans is a positive step towards providing Affected Households with access to emergency funds and low-interest loans. It is important to consider, however, that the amount and frequency that a Household saves is often, although not always, associated with its income earning capacity; continued focus on income restoration through employment creation is a pre-requisite if the savings groups are to sustainably thrive, and the amounts saved can grow into amounts that are large enough to meet the diverse needs of the member Households.

8.3. Key Findings

- Fully Affected Households have become economically marginalised as a result of resettlement.
- The economic situation of TA (Regular) Households has worsened following resettlement. 85% of Households perceive that their overall economic situation has ‘worsened’ or ‘greatly worsened’, while median Household incomes have almost halved from US\$344 to US\$183. In contrast, there was no significant difference in the gross income of Railway Households between 2011 and 2012; 83% of Railway Households stated their economic situation has ‘stayed the same’ in the last 12 months.
- The economic situation of just over half of the TA (Irregular) Households also worsened between 2011 and 2012. Median incomes of these Households fell from US\$265 to US\$233. The less dramatic economic impact on TA (Irregular) Households is most likely due to their coping strategy of not living at the Project relocation site.
- Reduced incomes among TA (Regular) Households are reflected in decreases in monthly spending; between 2011 and 2012 the median amount spent fell from US\$264 to US\$229. Reductions in spending appear to be targeted at education and food expenditures in particular.

- Even accounting for underreporting of incomes, there is a pronounced difference between monthly Household expenses and monthly incomes amongst TA (Regular) Households, raising questions about how these Households' will be able to continue to cope with such a large shortfall .
- Debt repayment has increased significantly amongst TA (Regular) Households (150%) and TA (Irregular) Households (174%) following relocation.
- The ability to save money declined in both the TA (Regular) and the Railway group between 2011 and 2012. In contrast, ability to save increased among TA (Irregular) Households. However, the amount saved by TA (Regular) and TA (Irregular) Households declined dramatically, to a mean of US\$1 per month for both groups. In contrast, amongst Railway Households the median amount saved in 2012 was US\$37 per month.

8.4. Recommendations

- Detailed information regarding the IRP and EIRP should be publicly disclosed, including regular independent monitoring reports.
- IRP/EIRP implementers and project partners should acknowledge the fact that savings groups do not replace lost income, and that for some of the most vulnerable Households, additional safety net measures (as outlined in other sections of this report) may be required before a Household is able to make regular savings. A growing body of evidence suggests that a tailored and multifaceted programme of access to livelihood activities, the transfer of productive assets and safety net/consumption support, the design of realistic savings plans, and the provision of free healthcare may be required in order to support the ultra-poor to graduate into a more stable and manageable state (Matin, Sulaiman, & Rabbani, 2008).
- Savings groups should incorporate savings goals around key areas of concern, such as food security, education, and health
- Financial literacy training provided by CUFA forms important additional support for Affected Households in managing their finances, though it does not replace the need for debt relief; leaders of community savings groups could be provided with additional training to allow them to continue supporting Affected Households once CUFA's direct activities come to an end

9

FROM INCREASED MORBIDITY TO IMPROVED HEALTH CARE

9.1. Introduction

The combined and cumulative risks associated with resettlement may lead to declines in the physical and mental health of Project Affected People. Food insecurity, temporary or prolonged periods of homelessness and unemployment, poor hygiene and sanitation infrastructure, limited access to health care facilities, and incidences of resettlement-induced stress and depression mean that it is not surprising that ‘...empirical research shows that displaced people experience higher levels of exposure and vulnerability to illness and severe disease than they did prior to displacement’ (Cernea, 2000, p. 28). Vulnerable groups such as children and the elderly may be disproportionately affected.

Cernea highlights that health-related risks are less readily recognised by resettlement agencies than other risks such as food insecurity (Cernea, 2000, p. 42). This might be in part because agencies do not have skilled personnel to assess the impact of resettlement on Affected Peoples’ health. Yet just as improved health is dependent on restored incomes and food security, the inverse is also true; Household members who are experiencing physical or mental health problems will struggle to engage in productive activities such as finding and maintaining employment or attending school, and the cycle of impoverishment will continue.


9.2. Findings

Measuring morbidity is challenging and STT is not experienced in working on issues related to physical and mental health. As a result, the questions in this survey were limited in scope. It is worth noting, however, that STT staff members who have spent considerable amounts of time with TA (Regular) Households report that indebtedness, combined with a lack of incomes, is causing some Household members considerable stress, which is perhaps impacting upon their ability to adapt to other resettlement-related challenges.

73.5% of TA (Regular) Households report that at least 1 Household member has been ill over the last 3 months. This is comparable with 71% of TA (Irregular) Households, but lower than amongst Railway Households (80%). It is encouraging to note that regardless of their situation, Households almost universally sought some form of treatment in response to illnesses experienced by Household members. The health care service providers ‘most usually’ sought by Households did appear to vary across groups, however. Private hospitals were the ‘most usual’ provider for TA (Regular) (41%) and Railway Households (27%). This was followed by private pharmacies (23% and 37% respectively). It seems likely that for more serious illnesses private hospitals are accessed but for minor illnesses, Households rely on private pharmacies. TA (Irregular) Households ‘most usually’ sought treatment at national government hospitals (20%)


in Phnom Penh, but also at private clinics (20%), and private pharmacies (20%). Only 6% of TA (Regular) Households report using the government health centre located in Trapeang Anhchanh village, a short walk from the Project sponsored resettlement site.

Figure 22 Health Care Service Provider ‘Most Usually’ Sought by the Household in the Last 3 Months



Given the location of the Project-sponsored resettlement site, it is not surprising that TA (Regular) Households had to travel significantly further to access health care facilities. 39% of TA (Regular) Households travelled 21km or further to reach their ‘most usual’ health care service provider. This contrasts with 90% of Railway and 75% of TA (Irregular) Households who travel between 0 and 5km. A relatively high proportion of TA (Regular) Households also travel between 0 and 5km; STT staff were informed that there is a private pharmacy based in the adjacent resettlement site which Households often access. A relatively well-equipped health centre is reportedly also located in a nearby village, but it is unclear if residents at Trapeang Anhchanh are aware of this.

Figure 23 Distance Travelled to Reach ‘Most Usual’ Health Care Service Provider



The costs of return transportation to the ‘most usual’ health provider for TA (Regular) Households are significantly higher than for the other communities, which could potentially result in Households delaying seeking treatment until health problems become more serious. It also appears that the median amount spent on treatment over the last 3 months is slightly higher for TA (Regular) Households (\$23 as opposed to \$15 amongst Railway and TA (Irregular)) and the mean is significantly higher.

Table 24 Mean and Median Total Amounts Spent on Transportation and Treatment

	Railway		TA (Regular)		TA (Irregular)	
	(n=56)	(n=65)	(n=29)	(n=39)	(n=18)	(n=14)
	Return transport cost to ‘most usual provider’ (\$)	Treatment (\$)	Transport (\$)	Treatment (\$)	Transport (\$)	Treatment (\$)
Mean	4	79	14	103	6	41.2
Median	2.5	15	7.5	23	2.5	15

9.3. Key Findings

- Although there is a government health centre in Trapeang Anhchanh, only 6% of TA (Regular) Households report using it. Instead, the majority of TA (Regular) Households travel over 20km to the ‘most usual’ health service provider, mainly private hospitals, while a high proportion also appear to access a nearby private pharmacy. The statistics raise questions regarding the quality of service provided by the government health centre in Trapeang Anhchanh, as well as TA (Regular) Households’ overall access to health care and awareness of health care providers in the area.
- In contrast, 90% of Railway and 75% of TA (Irregular) Households travel between 0 and 5km to access their ‘most usual’ health care providers, mainly private hospitals and clinics.
- A slightly higher amount was spent on monthly medical treatments by TA (Regular) Households (US\$23) compared to the two other groups (US\$15) in the three months preceding the survey.
- TA (Regular) Households also incur three times higher monthly transportation costs for medical treatments than the Households in the two other groups.

9.4. Recommendations

- STT welcomes the fact that Affected Households have been introduced to the SKY health insurance scheme. Research suggests, however, that health insurance is not always regarded as a good investment by the poor (Collins, Morduch, Rutherford, & Ruthven, 2009) and some of the poorest Households may not feel able or willing to make monthly premium payments (even if these payments derive from the social safety net fund). In addition, given that SKY will reportedly be phased out in 2013, it, at best, represents a short-term solution. For this reason STT urges RGC to prioritise assessing all Project Affected Households for the IDPoor Programme, which might allow them access to free or subsidised health care through the Health Equity Funds. AusAID is already promoting the increased coverage of Health Equity Funds and subsidised health care for the poor in Cambodia as part of the Australia-Cambodia Joint Aid Program Strategy 2010-2015 (AusAID, 2012, p. 11); this strategy would, therefore, be in line with broader donor objectives.
- The IRC should contract an external agency to provide a rapid assessment of health amongst Project Affected Households in the resettlement site in order to highlight i) potential areas for concern and ii) public health information priorities.
- It is clear the government health centre/post is not being greatly utilised and, as is common in Cambodia, there is a preference amongst Households for private health care service providers. In order to promote increased use of this facility, and other health facilities in the nearby area, it might be helpful to organise a community meeting with the health worker from the centre/post so that s/he can introduce the services that are offered, the procedures for referral to other facilities, and discuss logistical aspects such as fees and opening hours. The government should also ensure the health centre is adequately staffed and stocked.

10

FROM FOOD INSECURITY TO ADEQUATE NUTRITION

10.1. Introduction

Increased food insecurity is both ‘a symptom and a result of inadequate resettlement’ (Cernea, 2000, p. 27). When displaced communities depend on rural productive systems and are resettled in rural areas, it often takes a significant amount of time for them to re-establish their agricultural activities and become food secure. In this Project, however, Households were predominantly dependent on a cash economy and urban food markets prior to resettlement. This means that the link between land and food security is less relevant, although the link between location and food security remains strong. Food security is thus likely to be more strongly associated with the Affected Households’ capacity to retain or find employment and restore their incomes.

Hunger and malnutrition can have serious consequences for resettled Households; importantly, Cernea highlights that nutrition-related risks reinforce morbidity and mortality risks (Cernea, 2000, p. 27), and child health may be particularly acutely affected. Food insecurity may also cause significant psychological stress, with women often bearing the greatest burden for ensuring that Households’ quantity and quality of food is sufficient.

According to the Updated Resettlement Plan, Fully Affected Households were to receive cash ‘living allowances’ for between 3 and 6 months following resettlement. The amount to be provided varied based on the type of house structure and in a somewhat regressive fashion, the Households whose houses were larger and constructed from higher quality materials were entitled to receive more support for longer. The 50 Households whose businesses were affected were also to receive ‘loss of income compensation’. Households which were considered vulnerable were entitled to an additional ‘special assistance’ allowance in cash equivalent to 20kg of rice per Household member per month or US\$150 per Household. While it is clear that these measures were intended to provide support to Households during the resettlement process, and potentially mitigate the increased risks of unemployment and food insecurity, STT has documented the fact that it appears likely that the price of rice used to calculate the living allowances was out-dated, and further that some Households did not receive the full amount of compensation and living allowance that they were entitled to (Sahmakum Teang Tnaut, 2011, pp. 18-20). Indication that some Households at the relocation site were potentially suffering from food insecurity was documented by STT in early 2012 (Sahmakum Teang Tnaut, 2012); in May that year local human rights NGO LICADHO provided food aid to the worst affected Households.

10.2. Findings

Similar to the analysis of the risk of increased morbidity, STT is not experienced in measuring food security and for this reason survey questions were designed predominantly to capture Households' perceptions around their diets, and measure the number of meals per day and simple daily food expenditures. No attempts were made to measure the incidences of malnutrition or conduct detailed analyses of the Households' nutritional intake. Nevertheless the data collected provides a snapshot of the situation for Affected Households, which may be studied in greater depth if necessary.

It is clear that TA (Regular) Households have quite dramatically different perceptions of their food consumption patterns when compared against TA (Irregular) and Railway Households. 79% of TA (Regular) Households believe that over the last 6 months, the Household has not had 'enough food'; this compares with 50% of TA (Irregular) Households and only 21% of Railway Households. In addition, over the last 12 months 62% of TA (Regular) Households report that the overall quantity and quality of the food that they consume has greatly worsened or worsened. This compares with 25% for TA (Irregular) Households and just 9% for Railway Households. 81% of Railway Households and 71% of TA (Irregular) Households believe that the overall quantity and quality of food that their Household consumes has stayed the same over the last 12 months which is strikingly different to the situation amongst TA (Regular) Households.

Figure 24 Households' Perceptions Regarding Whether They Have Had 'Enough Food' Over the Last 6 Months





Figure 25 Households' Perceptions Regarding the Extent to Which the Amount and Quality of Food Consumed Has Changed Over the Last 12 Months



Households' perceptions are to a large extent supported by the more objective data on the number of meals per day and approximate food expenditures. 54% of TA (Regular) Households only have 2 meals per day, compared with 46% of Railway Households and just 29% of TA (Irregular) Households. Interestingly, Railway and TA (Irregular) Households both spend a mean amount of approximately 18,000 Riel on food per day, and a median amount of 20,000 Riel. This is substantially more than the amount spent by TA (Regular) Households. In light of the fact that the TA (Regular) Households also contain more Household members, the data appears to suggest that it is likely that these Households are facing challenges ensuring that their Household members have sufficient food.

Table 25 Number of Meals Per Day

	Railway (n=90)	TA (Regular) (n=68)	TA (Irregular) (n=28)
1	0%	0%	0%
2	46%	54%	29%
3	56%	46%	71%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Table 26 Mean and Median Amount Spent on Food Per Day

	Railway (n=91)	TA (Regular) (n=66)	TA (Irregular) (n=28)
Mean	18,300 Riel (\$4.58)	13,500 Riel (\$3.36)	18,000 Riel (4.50)
Median	20,000 Riel(\$5.00)	12,000 Riel (\$4.00)	20,000 Riel (\$5.00)

(Nb. Exchange rate calculated at 4,000 Riel = \$1)


Per person per day food expenditure was calculated by simply dividing the total daily Household expenditure on food by the total number of Household members. STT acknowledges the limitations to this method, and understands that accurate per person per day food calculations require more detailed data than it was possible to collect for this survey. In addition, food expenditure is not necessarily reflective of the nutritional value of the food purchased. The figures outlined below are therefore only intended to be approximations. Even interpreted in a cautious manner, however, they do appear to reveal a worrying trend; the median food expenditure per person per day was only 2,500 Riel for TA (Regular) residents, compared with 3,875 Riel for Trapeang Anhchanh (Irregular) residents, and 3,333 Riel for Railway residents. Using a food bundle methodology which is expected to provide a subsistence diet of 2,100 calories per day, the World Bank estimated that the 2007 urban food poverty line for Cambodia was 2,445 Riel per person per day (World Bank, 2009, p. 7). While there was a significant difference between the Railway and TA (Irregular) per person per day food expenditures and the food poverty line, there was no significant difference between the per person per day food expenditures and the urban food poverty line for the TA (Regular) Households, suggesting that many TA (Regular) Households are living very close to the 2007 food poverty line for urban Cambodia. Indeed 29 Households spend less than 2,500 Riel per person per day, and 23 of these spend less than 2000 Riel per person per day. Given that this data was collected in July-September 2012, and the food poverty line figure is based on data from 2007, it is likely that many Households in Trapeang Anhchanh would fall well below an updated food poverty line. While the amount of money spent on food does not necessarily imply the food consumed is less nutritious, TA (Regular) Households' apparent post-resettlement reduction in food expenditure combined with their perceptions on food consumption, does suggest these Households' food security has been negatively affected by resettlement.

Table 27 Person per Day Food Expenditure and the Cambodian Urban Food Poverty Line

	N	Urban Food Poverty Value=2,445 Riel	
		Median (Riel/ person/day)	Significance. (2-tailed)
Railway	91	3,333	0.000
TA (Regular)	66	2,500	0.874
TA (Irregular)	28	3,875	0.000

Households were also asked to outline their coping strategies when their Household income is not sufficient to meet their expenses. TA (Regular) Households mainly employ a variety of short-term, food-related coping strategies to manage the deficit; in a question in which multiple responses were allowed, 50% of responses were related to reducing the number of meals per day, eating less food at each meal, or eating less expensive food. Worryingly an additional 21% of responses mentioned foraging for food, most likely in the nearby rice fields. By contrast this was only cited twice by respondents in the other 2 groups. Responses from TA (Irregular) Households suggest that eating less expensive food was the predominant coping strategy for this group, while the Railway responses appear to suggest that while food-related coping strategies are still important, Households also have a wider range of longer-term options such as borrowing money from friends or relatives, taking out loans, or seeking additional employment.

Figure 26 Household Coping Strategies When Household Income is Insufficient to Meet Expenses



Multiple responses were allowed - Railway (n=115), TA (Regular) (n=179), and TA (Irregular) (n=34)

10.10. Key findings

- Food insecurity appears to be a serious issue amongst TA (Regular) Households.
- TA (Regular) Households perceive the amount and quality of food consumed to have reduced and worsened since relocation. In contrast, TA (Irregular) and Railway Households report no significant perceived change.
- The perception of reduced food amount and quality amongst TA (Regular) Households is supported by data on the number of meals per day: the majority eat only two meals per day, compared to the two other groups in which the majority of Households eat three meals per day, although 46% of Railway Households eat only two meals.
- Figures on per person per day food expenditure reveal the impact that relocation has had on TA (Regular) Households: median food expenditure per person per day was only 2,500 Riel for TA (Regular) residents, compared with 3,875 Riel for TA (Irregular) residents, and 3,333 Riel for Railway residents.
- Although there are limitations to STT's methodology, it appears likely that the food expenditures of TA (Regular) Households were not significantly different from the World Bank's 2007 urban food poverty line, while those of the two other groups were significantly above. Given that the urban food poverty is likely to have increased since 2007, TA (Regular) Households could be expected to fall well below the current food poverty line.
- In response to food insecurity, TA (Regular) Households are resorting to coping strategies including foraging, borrowing money, and eating less, as well as less expensive, food.

10.11. Recommendations

- Additional safety net mechanisms, in the form of subsistence food or cash allowances, should be designed and implemented until there is unequivocal evidence that incomes have been restored. The RGC already has experience of implementing safety net projects, and such a project would align with AusAID's Australia-Cambodia Joint Aid Program Strategy 2010-2015 which focuses on strengthening social protection systems and safety net support for the poor (AusAID, 2012, p. 16)). The RGC should work with relevant stakeholders to overcome the sensitive issues pertaining to eligibility, amounts and delivery mechanisms (Cernea, 2006). The timeframe for the provision of support could be reviewed at regular intervals and, if appropriate, receipt of safety net support could be conditional on all children in the Household attending school, and/or Household participation in the IRP/EIRP.
- The local primary school should provide an on-site daily nutritious meal to all pupils. This is already being implemented in many rural schools in Cambodia by the RGC in partnership with the World Food Programme (WFP), and it would represent a relatively cost-effective strategy to mitigate the increased risks of malnourishment and associated poor health amongst Project Affected children. Children of the earlier residents of Trapeang Anhchanh (the 'host community') should also be eligible for such support. The timeframe for the provision of support could be reviewed annually.
- A comprehensive independent investigation should be conducted into whether all Affected Households received the amounts of compensation and living allowance support which were outlined in the Updated Resettlement Plan. This could be achieved by extending the OSPF's mandate to cover not only those Households who signed the initial complaint to the agency, but all Affected Households. If it is proven that Households did not receive their full entitlements, the discrepancy should be paid immediately. Households that did not receive the correct amount of compensation should also be eligible for additional compensation and assistance to counter harms suffered as a result of inadequate compensation.

FROM LOSS OF ACCESS TO RESTORATION OF COMMUNITY ASSETS AND SERVICES

11.1. Introduction

Cernea highlights the fact that the loss of access to common property, community assets, and established services poses a greater challenge for people who are poor and vulnerable, particularly those who are landless and have very few assets (Cernea, 2000, p. 29). For rural communities these assets might be bodies of water, forests, fields, grazing land, and burial grounds. In urban areas community assets might be in the form of trading and market places, social spaces, and access to shared transportation facilities and utilities. Both rural and urban communities may suffer from limited access to health and education services following resettlement. Indeed some scholars have called for the incorporation of the loss of access to public services and education to be incorporated into Cernea's IRR model (Mathur, 1998; Mahapatra, 1999). Interestingly in this Project the railway tracks themselves acted as a community asset; the tracks were used as a space for trading, to organise community meetings, to socialise, and for children to play.

The Updated Resettlement Plan for the Phnom Penh Section does recognise that access to services is important for the community, and, somewhat misleadingly, highlights that the Project-sponsored resettlement site was selected '...due to the presence of services nearby...the site is near Trapeang Anhchanh developed by Phnom Penh Municipality where now become [sic] a populous area with primary school, market, and health centre' (Ministry of Public Works and Transport, 2010, p. 15). Unfortunately the Plan did not provide a more detailed analysis of the type of services available – such as whether the market is simply a building or a place active commerce - and the exact distance of the service from the Project-sponsored resettlement site. The market area closest to the site is barely functional due to low levels of demand in the resettled communities, and although there is a primary school on-site and the nearest Secondary School (Samrong Krom) is located approximately 5km away, the nearest High School (Champouwan) is located 8.4km from the site, which obviously poses transportation problems for older children. In addition there was no discussion around whether the existing services have the capacity to absorb the resettled populations.

One of the key benefits of living in urban areas, even for poor families, is access to education for their children, and the associated hope that parents have that their children will have greater opportunities than they themselves enjoyed. The 2008 Census highlighted that 59.8% of young people aged 15-19 in urban areas attend a school/educational institute, compared with 49.7% in rural areas (National Institute of Statistics, 2008). If resettled children and young people are unable to continue their education because the distance from the Project-sponsored resettlement site to the school is too great, or, as a result of increased joblessness and indebtedness, the Household can no longer afford the costs associated with education (transportation, lunch, school materials, and informal fees for school entry and teaching), the Project risks potentially contributing to the onset of inter-generational poverty. Not only is there a legal and an ethical case for ensuring that young Project Affected People do not have their education curtailed

as a result of resettlement, there is a strong practical argument. If the community at Trapeang Anhchanh is ever going to prosper, it can only do so if its young people are able to educate themselves and develop the skills required by an increasingly competitive urban labour market.

11.9. Findings

The questions in the Household survey predominantly focus on access to health and education facilities, as opposed to a broader definition of community assets and services. In light of the fact that people under the age of 20 form a large proportion of the TA (Regular) and TA (Irregular) populations (47% and 42% respectively), monitoring access to education is vital.

The level of school attendance is highest amongst children and young people in Railway Households (92%) followed by TA (Irregular) Households (85%), and lowest amongst TA (Regular) Households (77%). Worryingly, girls appear to be bearing a disproportionate share of the burden; while no significant relationship exists between gender and school attendance in Railway and TA (Irregular) communities, there is a significant relationship between gender and school attendance in TA (Regular); only 63% of girls are currently attending school, compared with 91% of boys. It is also true, however, that girls in TA (Regular) Households were less likely to attend school prior to resettlement ($p=0.007$), although the survey did not investigate the reasons behind this.

Table 28 School Attendance According to Gender

Gender	Railway		TA (Regular)		TA (Irregular)	
	(n=114)	(n=10)	(n=85)	(n=26)	(n=29)	(n=5)
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Boy	92%	8%	91%	9%	84%	16%
Girl	92%	8%	63%	37%	87%	13%
Total	92%	8%	77%	23%	85%	15%
Pearson Chi-Squared	0.26		11.76		0.40	
Sig.	0.873		.001		0.841	


Nb. All children who are too young to attend school have been removed from this analysis

15 out of 26 children in TA (Regular) who were not attending school were unable to do so due to limited Household income, 3 children were ill, and 4 were unable to attend due to the distance from their homes to the school combined with financial constraints. 10 children are too young to attend school and 1 is already working. No data is available for the remaining children. In the Railway and TA (Irregular) communities, 7 and 2 children respectively are unable to attend school as a result of a lack of Household income. No Households cite distance to a school as a reason for lack of attendance.

The overwhelming majority ($\geq 90\%$) of children attending schools in all three communities appear to attend state schools, most likely because private schools, which are very common in Phnom Penh, are relatively unaffordable to Households earning low incomes. This suggests that proximity and access to a state school is vital. Children in Railway Households appear to travel the shortest distance to attend school, with 89% of

children travelling 0-2km. This compares with 78% for TA (Regular) Households and 49% of TA (Irregular) Households. 15% of TA (Regular) Households travel 11km or further, perhaps reflecting the fact that some parents did not want to interrupt their children's education following resettlement, and have organised for their children to continue to study in their previous schools.

Figure 27 Distance Travelled by Children Attending School



Railway (n=124), TA (Regular) (n=82), and TA (Irregular) (n=29)

11.2. Key findings

- Overall school attendance among children in the TA (Regular) population is, at 77%, noticeably lower than in the two other groups where attendance is 92% and 85% among Railway and TA (Irregular) children respectively. Girls in particular appear to not attend school in Trapeang Anhchanh; it is unclear if this is resettlement-related, although no significant relationship exists between gender and school attendance in Railway and TA (Irregular) communities.
- The main reason cited by TA (Regular) Households for children not to attend school was limited Household income.
- A clear majority of school-aged children in all three groups attend state school, although 15% of children in TA (Regular) Households appear not to attend the state schools in the area, and instead travel 11km or further to attend school.
- Compared to the 2008 Census finding that 59.8% of young people aged 15-19 in urban areas attend a school/educational institute, in Trapeang Anhchanh 11 young people aged 15-19 attend school (37%), while 19 do not (63%). This compares with 29 young people aged 15-19 attending school in the Railway community (74%), against 10 who do not (26%).

11.3. Recommendations

- The IRC and the local education authority, in collaboration with IRP/EIRP implementers and project donors, should contact all Households containing children under the age of 18 who are not involved in employment, education or training, to determine the barriers to education, and develop joint and tailored solutions with each Household.
- The IRP/EIRP implementers should build links with well-established providers of vocational education and training, such as Pour un Sourire d’Enfant (PSE), HAGAR, Don Bosco, Yejj, Digital Divide Data, and Mith Samlanh. Representatives from these agencies who have current capacity/vacancies could be invited to the site to discuss with the community the opportunities that they offer.
- If not already occurring, IRP/EIRP implementers should consider incorporating education expenses as part of the social safety net fund.
- If transportation costs and means are deemed to be a significant barrier to access, potential solutions could be the provision of shared transportation (as outlined in the joblessness recommendations) or the purchase of bicycles by the EIRP.
- The IRC and the local education authority, in collaboration with IRP/EIRP implementers and project donors, should review the capacity of local schools to accept new students, and consider providing support if necessary. This is particularly important in light of further relocation to Trapeang Anhchanh.

12

FROM SOCIAL DISARTICULATION TO NETWORKS AND COMMUNITY REBUILDING

12.1. Introduction

The social impacts of resettlement are difficult to measure, and are often under-estimated and under-compensated. Social impacts can be felt at the Household level, the community level and in the interactions that the resettled community has with its neighbours and relevant authorities. According to Cernea:

Forced displacement tears apart the existing social fabric. It disperses and fragments communities, dismantles patterns of social organisation and interpersonal ties; kinship groups become scattered as well. Life sustaining informal networks of reciprocal help, local voluntary associations, and self-organised mutual service are disrupted. There is a net loss of valuable “social capital,” that compounds the loss of natural, physical, and human capital.

(Cernea, 2000, p. 30).

There appears to be a strong and mutually reinforcing relationship between levels of social capital and community cohesion and the Affected Peoples’ capacity to cope with the shocks associated with resettlement. Importantly, this is often intertwined with, and further compounded by, the resources allocated to Affected Households as part of the Resettlement Plan (Rodrigo, 1991); per family or per capita resources can determine the subsequent viability and success of the post-resettlement community and must be above a minimum threshold for the community to ‘take off’ post-resettlement. If resources are below a critical limit then the already long and complex process of rebuilding trust and community institutions is likely to be substantially more challenging and protracted, which in turn may negatively affect individuals’ and Households’ long-term ability to cope. Borrowing from migration studies, the resettlement literature also details the potential for problems in the process of integration into the host community, sometimes as a result of an increased pressure on existing services and resources following resettlement, or due to perceptions and envy around compensation packages.

The Updated Resettlement Plan pays very little attention to the loss of social capital and the risk of social disarticulation, in spite of the fact that the Affected Households originated from a number of different communities along the railway, and may have had very limited interaction with each other prior to resettlement. The IRP professes to take into consideration the fact that the Affected Households’ chances of being able to re-establish their incomes will be ‘further compromised unless they are resettled in a way that will maintain their existing closeness and ties with one another. The IRP will capitalise on these existing ties and will, to the extent possible, formalise this [sic] into self-help groups that will serve as the catalyst within which the AHs would decide on the appropriate livelihood activities each shall pursue’ (Ministry of Public Works and Transport, 2010, p. 33; Annex 6). Yet the self-help groups were established


after resettlement had occurred, when Households were already struggling with unemployment and debt. The low levels of compensation received, combined the inadequacy of the measures outlined in the IRP/ EIRP means that it is very likely that many Households had already fallen below the critical level outlined by Rodrigo, making it much more challenging to establish community institutions and build social capital. While SBK has taken steps to build trust with the community and ensure that the self-help groups are effective, their work has been made much more challenging by the very difficult situation that many of the fully Affected Households are facing.

Unsurprisingly, and as predicted in the literature, integration into the host community has also posed challenges; the Updated Resettlement Plan rather superficially assumes that that ‘the population of [the host community] is similar to the 161 Households to be relocated by the railway project. Therefore, ‘the integration with this community should not be a problem’ (Ministry of Public Works and Transport, 2010, p. 15). Conversely, relations between some resettled Households and the host community have been tense, although it appears that there have been improvements in recent months.

12.2. Findings

When respondents were asked which response best described the situation of their Household, 15% of TA (Regular) Households replied that they do not have many good friends or neighbours in the community. 14% of Railway Households reported feeling the same. Only 15% of TA (Regular) Households reported that they have many good friends or neighbours in the community, compared with 53% of Railway Households and 43% of TA (Irregular) Households. Interestingly, however, 34% of TA (Regular) and 39% of TA (Irregular) Households are members of groups or associations which represent their interests. This compares with just 9% of Railway Households, suggesting that it is possible that the resettlement process has mobilised Households to better organise themselves.


Figure 28 Households’ Relations with Friends and Neighbours in Their Community



Levels of trust amongst TA (Regular) Households appear far lower than in the other communities; only 22% of TA (Regular) Households believe that generally speaking, ‘people can be trusted’, compared with 66% of Railway Households and 68% of TA (Irregular) Households. This may hinder attempts to build

and consolidate Self-Help Groups and other community activities. It is possible, however, that the Self-Help Groups may contribute towards fostering increased trust in the resettlement site, which would be beneficial to the long term process of building community institutions, although it is likely that this process will take some time.


Figure 29 Levels of Trust Amongst Households



Left to right: Railway (n=91), TA (Regular) (n=68), and TA (Irregular) (n=28)

In addition to a lack of trust in the community, it appears that Households in the resettlement site have a greater preponderance to feeling unsafe in their community. When asked to what extent they agreed with the statement 'I feel safe and secure in this community', 43% of TA (Regular) Households either strongly disagreed or disagreed. 18% of Railway Households and just 4% of TA (Irregular) Households disagreed with this statement. The survey was not able to capture the reasons for this perception, but contributing factors could include poor relations with the host community, threats from informal lenders (which appear to have subsided in recent months), the isolated location of the resettlement site, and the fact that the site appears to be home to proportionally larger numbers of women and children living alone.

Figure 30 Households' Perceptions of Safety and Security in the Community



Railway (n=91), TA (Regular) (n=68), and TA (Irregular) (n=28)

As highlighted previously, however, findings outlined in this report derive from data collected prior to additional interventions at the site, including the functionalisation of the Self-Help Groups. In addition, data collection at Trapeang Anhchanh occurred when threats and intimidation by money lenders was perhaps most intense and followed a violent attack on residents at the site in April 2012, reportedly led by the local Village Chief. Since then, it appears that the situation has calmed down somewhat, and feelings of insecurity and lack of safety may hence have dissipated from the highs outlined in this report.

12.3. Key findings

- Although this data is fairly limited in scope, and a qualitative assessment might provide greater insight, it appears that levels of social capital, trust, and community cohesion have been negatively impacted by the resettlement process: 15% of TA (Regular) Households replied that they do not have many good friends or neighbours in the community; only 22% stated they believe that generally speaking, 'people can be trusted'; 43% of TA (Regular) Households either strongly disagreed or disagreed with the statement 'I feel safe and secure in this community'.
- Although the community is perhaps better organised as a result of resettlement, restoring and building mutually re-enforcing relations of trust and support will be challenging when individual Households' resources are so limited. As with many of the risks outlined by Cernea, restoring incomes is a vital pre-requisite to mitigating the risk of social disarticulation. STT welcomes the commitment to build a community centre in Trapeang Anhchanh, but believes that further measures are required.

12.4. Recommendations

- There have been a number of disputes between the community leaders of the resettled Households and the Village Chief of the host community. An external actor, such as the Sangkat together with SBK, should attempt to mediate between the two parties, in an effort to improve relations. The possibility of residents of Trapeang Anhchanh to elect their own Village Chief should also be explored.
- The development of community centre at Trapeang Anhchanh has already commenced and is a welcome step towards strengthening community cohesion and solidarity. To avoid the centre becoming a source of contention between those resettled and the host community, the resettled households should be encouraged to offer use of the space to the host community. Training sessions and meetings that occur in the centre should, where relevant, include and involve both communities.

13

GENERAL RESETTLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

The above sections outlining Cernea's eight point Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction Model contain specific recommendations aimed at mitigating and/or amending the harms Affected Households have suffered as a result of the Project. Additional, more general recommendations can however also be made, with a view of improving future resettlement processes and outcomes and preventing Affected Households from suffering harms. These include:

- The RGC should develop a comprehensive, rights-based Relocation Policy, outlining steps to be taken before, during, and after relocation. Development partners such as the ADB are in an ideal position to support this. At a minimum, the relocation policy should outline the following principles:
 - Relocation is considered as a last resort
 - When relocation is unavoidable, resettlement represents a development and poverty reduction opportunity leading to improved living standards for Affected Households
 - Meaningful participation by Affected Households in all stages of the relocation, including planning and decision-making regarding the move, adequate time for community organising and participatory planning prior to relocation, and choice of relocation site location and lay-out;
 - Prior to relocation, all sites should have access to basic infrastructure, including (but not limited to) access roads and utilities, and be within reasonable proximity to basic services such as health care providers and schools;
 - Sites should be located near appropriate income-generating opportunities and transportation links.
- Project partners should publicly disclose Resettlement Plans prior to their approval, as well as engage Affected Households and relevant civil society actors in meaningful consultation. Civil society actors and Affected Households may have information vital to improving resettlement plans, processes, and outcomes. Current lack of transparency exemplified in Resettlement Plans being published only after approval, and when changes are no longer possible, increases the risk of unsuccessful resettlement.
- In developing Resettlement Plans, Project partners should consider relocation of Affected Households to more than one area. Identification of smaller sites in more developed and centrally located areas can prevent slum-creation associated with large-scale relocations to remote areas, as well as reduce costs associated with provision of basic services in remote locations

- Project partners should increase the amount of resources allocated to organising and advising Affected Households prior to relocation. This could include financial literacy training, such as currently provided by CUFA
- When relocation involves house construction by the Affected Households, Project partners should provide advice and assistance in terms of budgeting for construction costs, purchasing materials in bulk, allowing time for incremental building, and training in housing construction. Vulnerable households such as female-headed and elderly households should qualify for additional assistance, e.g. in the form of additional funds to pay fellow Affected Persons for house construction labour
- Project partners should provide access to appropriate housing finance options prior to resettlement as part of the compensation package. Waiting until after resettlement has already occurred before tackling the difficult issue of housing finance is not a sensible approach; higher levels of unemployment during the transition period combined with the fact that Households may already be indebted means that many Households would no longer be considered viable borrowers by loan providers. First Finance Plc, the only financial institution specialised in housing finance for low income groups in Cambodia, could be engaged for this purpose.
- Income restoration activities should commence prior to relocation. E.g. establishment of savings groups prior to relocation can allow Affected Households to hedge against potential drops in income as a result of relocation, as well as strengthen community trust and organising; provision of training and identification of employment opportunities at the relocation site prior to relocation can help Affected Households in moving from one job to another and thus minimise impacts of relocation on Households' income generation
- Project partners should commit to compensating Affected Households if efforts outlined in the Resettlement Plans fail or are implemented incorrectly to the effect that Affected Households are harmed. This should not be perceived as setting unachievable resettlement precedents but addressing harms caused by the Project.
- Project partners should strengthen monitoring of resettlement and its impacts, including committing to timely public disclosure of monitoring reports.
- The RGC, in partnership with donors, is already piloting and implementing a wide range of social safety net programmes, such as the reduced and free access to healthcare, large scale food feeding programmes, and conditional cash transfers. In recognition of the increased vulnerability of resettled Households, the RGC should consider extending these programmes to resettled communities.
- The awarding of the IRP/EIRP contracts should be conducted following a well-publicised and transparent tendering/proposal process. Successful agencies should be subject to rigorous reporting processes and regular monitoring by project donors, including public disclosure of relevant project plans and progress reports.

14 CONCLUSION

Development-induced displacement is common in Cambodia. Whether it results from private development or aid-funded infrastructure projects, it represents myriad challenges both for those implementing the relocation, and, especially, those relocated. The objective of this research was to use Cernea's Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction Model to assess the socio-economic outcomes of relocation as part of the GMS Rehabilitation of the Railway in Cambodia Project in Phnom Penh, and analyse the extent to which the resettlement risks outlined in the model have been mitigated.

The data collected as part of this research unequivocally shows that in the short run, Households relocated as part of the Project have been harmed. The group of 68 relocated Households resident in Trapeang Anhchanh resettlement site for at least four nights per week (abbreviated as TA (Regular) Households) appear to have suffered resettlement-related harms in almost every category of risks identified in Cernea's model. The 28 TA (Irregular) Households, i.e. relocated Households that are resident for less than four nights per week in Trapeang Anhchanh and whose coping strategy predominantly includes renting properties close to their previous homes, have seem to have fared marginally better, ostensibly on account of opting not to live at the Project-sponsored site. By comparison, the living standards of the 91 Households still living along the railway tracks saw no marked change between 2011 and 2012.

The key findings of the report against each of the risks outlined by Cernea can be summarised as follows:

From landlessness to land-based resettlement: While the allocation of land to Affected Households is arguably the central benefit arising from the resettlement process, the remote location of Trapeang Anhchanh undermines the usefulness of the plots, in particular as it does not allow for Affected Households to continue with their previous income-generating activities. As such, selection of Trapeang Anhchanh as the relocation site, in complete disregard of the Affected Households' key priorities to live 'close to a market' and 'close to the city' and against the 2006 Resettlement Plan according to which the relocation site should be within 3-5km of the Households previous location, sowed the seeds for further failures. The difference in post-relocation living standards between the TA (Regular) and TA (Irregular) Households pointedly mark the importance of location, given that there are no significant differences in the demographics of the two groups.

From joblessness to re-employment: Loss of employment and income-generating opportunities, and the associated decline in incomes, is one of the most evident harms suffered by relocated Households. While both TA (Regular) and TA (Irregular) Households experienced statistically significant job loss and declines in incomes following relocation, with the former group experiencing larger losses and declines, incomes and employment levels of the Railway Households saw minimal change over 2011-2012. As of April 2013, over 18 months since relocation, significant income-generating opportunities at Trapeang Anhchanh remain elusive despite the on-going Income Restoration Program and the AusAID-supported Expanded Income Restoration Program.

From homelessness to house reconstruction: Households resident at Trapeang Anhchanh are in significant debt. 98% of TA (Regular) Households owe money to someone, most often informal moneylenders; 97% of these say that they are struggling to repay their debt. The presence of predatory moneylenders that charge exorbitant monthly interest rates at the site has been acknowledged by all parties, and important steps have been taken to prevent relocated Households from losing their plots – used as collateral – to the moneylenders. At the same time, however, significant steps have not been taken to relieve the affected Households of their debt. This report shows that the debt incurred by relocated Households, both TA (Regular) and TA (Irregular), is resettlement-related: low and often incorrect compensation did not allow Affected Households to re-build their lives in Trapeang Anhchanh. Many Affected Households took loans to build new homes at the relocation site, which generally cost significantly more than their meagre compensation; there is a well-known theory that relocated Households aspire to build better housing at their new location, yet no measures were taken to mitigate this risk. As long as no comprehensive measures are taken to relieve the debt of Affected Households, TA (Regular) Households in particular remain at risk of losing their plots and thereby the most positive aspect of the resettlement process. The on-going indebtedness also has the potential to undermine all and any other interventions aimed at restoring the livelihoods at Trapeang Anhchanh, as well as efforts to build trust and community cohesion at the site.

From marginalisation to social inclusion: Data on Household expenditures and perceptions of the overall economic situation of relocated Households further attest to their economic marginalisation. While the TA (Irregular) Households' coping strategy of not living at Trapeang Anhchanh appears to some extent to have spared them the negative economic impact of relocation, TA (Regular) Households' expenditures dropped dramatically between 2011 and 2012, while median Household incomes almost halved from US\$344 to US\$183. Even accounting for under-reporting of incomes, the pronounced difference between TA (Regular) Households' incomes and expenditures, combined with their high debt levels, raises serious questions of how these Households will be able to cope with such a large shortfall over time.

From increased morbidity to improved health care: While the data presented on health impacts is limited, indications that TA (Regular) Households spend more on, and travel further for, health care are of concern. Combined with food insecurity among Households at Trapeang Anhchanh, the health of residents, particularly children, could be at risk.

From food insecurity to adequate nutrition: This report has shown that food expenditures of TA (Regular) Households were not significantly different from the World Bank's 2007 urban food poverty line at the time of the survey. Given that the urban food poverty line is likely to have increased since 2007, TA (Regular) Households are likely to fall well below it.

From loss of access to restoration of community assets and services: Demographics of Trapeang Anhchanh residents show 47% of Household members in the TA (Regular) group are aged 20 or under. As a result, almost half of those bearing the brunt of any resettlement-related impoverishment are likely to be children and young people. Data on school attendance among children in TA (Regular) Households show that there is real cause for concern: Overall school attendance among children in the TA (Regular) population is, at 77%, noticeably lower than in the two other groups where attendance is 92% and 85% among Railway and TA (Irregular) children respectively. This raises concerns about the onset of inter-generational poverty.

From social disarticulation to networks and community rebuilding: While the data presented is limited in scope, it appears that levels of social capital, trust, and community cohesion have been negatively impacted by the resettlement process.

In sum, this report shows that on each of the risks identified, the Project failed to take the necessary

mitigative actions, to the detriment of resettlement outcomes. As such, there is a prominent need for the Royal Government of Cambodia together with the ADB and AusAID to take prompt corrective action. This report has made specific recommendations on each of the issues highlighted, and the Authors are aware Project partners have made efforts to improve the situation, which may have had positive impacts in the interim between data collection and publication of this Report. However, a comprehensive action plan is lacking. To fundamentally address the Project's resettlement failures in Phnom Penh, there is a distinct need for Project partners, together with the Affected Households, to develop a comprehensive corrective action plan with the aim of bringing the living standards of Affected Households at least back to pre-relocation levels.

As Project partners prepare for the further relocation of some 105 Households in Phnom Penh, there are also valuable lessons to be learnt. Disclosure of resettlement plans and meaningful consultation on these ahead of any relocation would significantly help to prevent the kind of resettlement failures the Project has to date suffered from by strengthening transparency, information disclosure, and dialogue. In addition, participatory development of income restoration programmes and their commencement prior to relocation would allow Affected Households a greater sense of ownership of the situation, thus also contributing to better outcomes. The Authors are aware that some measures are being taken with the aim of improving the resettlement outcomes for the 105 Households compared to those previously relocated under the Project. While this is positive, it at the same time highlights the need to, as a matter of urgency, address the existing failures at Trapeang Anhchanh and ensure that all members of Households affected by the Project can 'develop their potentials as productive members of society at a level generally at least equivalent to that which was likely to have prevailed in the absence of the development intervention.' (ADB, 1995, p. 1)

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16 ANNEXES

Annex I: Copy of a Land Receipt Issued to Trapeang Anhchanh Residents

ដីឡូត៍លេខ: [REDACTED]

ទីតាំងដី ស្ថិតនៅភូមិ [REDACTED]សង្កាត់ [REDACTED]

ខណ្ឌដង្កោ រាជធានីភ្នំពេញ

អ្នកទទួលដីឡូត៍

ឈ្មោះ: [REDACTED]ភេទ: [REDACTED] ..អាយុ [REDACTED] ឆ្នាំ

ធ្វើនៅថ្ងៃទី.....ខែ.....ឆ្នាំ ២០១១

អភិបាល ទំនេរណៈភិបាលខណ្ឌ

Annex II: English Translation of a Land Receipt Issued to Trapeang Anhchanh Residents

Plot Number: [....]

Location in Village [....] Commune [....] District [....] Phnom Penh.

Plot Receiver

Name [....] Sex [....] Age [....] years.

[Date]

[Thumb Print of Receiver]

Date Issued day [....] month [....] year [....]

District Chief

[Stamp and Signature of District Chief]

[Name of District Chief].

Annex III: Household Survey – English Version

Socio-Economic Survey of Resettlement in Trapeang Anhchanh Thmei

Date: ____/____/____ Time Started: _____ Time Finished: _____ Survey code: ____|____|____|
 Interviewer Name: _____ Data Checked?: _____ Data Cleaned?: _____

SECTION 1: HOUSEHOLD AND DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

No.	Question	Answer	Code	Skip
1-1	Name of respondent:			
1-2	Current Address:	1: Plot Number: _____ 2: Village: _____ 3: Sangkat: _____ 4: Khan: _____		
1-3	Gender of respondent:	Male Female	1 2	
1-4	Age of respondent:	Age: ____ ____ ____ Don't Know.....	99	
1-5	What level of education have you received?	No schooling Some primary Completed primary Some secondary Completed secondary Higher than secondary	1 2 3 4 5 6	
1-6	How many years did you attend school?	Years: ____ ____ ____		
1-7	Can you read and write?	Yes No	1 2	
1-8	What is your marital status?	Single Married/Living together Divorced/separated Widowed Other	1 2 3 4 5	
1-9	How many people are currently living in your household ?	Number: ____ ____ ____		
1-10	How old are the members in your household?	0-5 ____ ____ ____ 6-20 ____ ____ ____ 21-45 ____ ____ ____ 46-65 ____ ____ ____ 66 or older ____ ____ ____		
1-11	Is this household headed by a man or a woman?	Man Woman	1 2	
1-12	Does anyone in your household possess the following?	National ID Card Voter ID Card Birth Certificate Family Book		
	Yes	1	1	1
	Yes, but not in current possession	2	2	2
	No, never had one	3	3	3
	No – lost it	4	4	4
1-13	If you are in possession of a family book, is it registered at your current address?	Yes No	1 2	
1-14	If no, Did your household register a family book at your current address already?	Yes No	1 2	
1-15	If no, why is your family book not yet registered at your current address?			
1-16	Does anyone in this household experience any of the following?	Difficulty seeing Difficulty hearing Difficulty speaking Difficulty moving Psychological or behavioural difficulties Learning difficulties Fits Other (please specify) None Don't know	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 99	
1-17	Is the head of the household aged 65 years or older?	Yes No	1 2	

SECTION 2: HOUSING AND INFRASTRUCTURE SITUATION

No.	Question	Answer	Code	Skip
2-1	How long have you been living in this location (resettlement site)?	Years: __ __ Months: __ __		
2-2	Where did you live prior to this location?	Village: _____ Sangkat: _____ Khan: _____		
2-3	What was the size of your house in your previous location? NOTE TO ENUMERATORS: PLEASE TAKE A PHOTO OF THE DMS	_____ (m)X _____ (m)		
2-4	How many floors did your house have in your previous location?	One floor on the ground One floor on stilts Two floors	1 2 3	
2-5	What was the primary construction material of the household's floor in the previous location?	Earth/clay Wood or logs Bamboo strips Brick/Concrete/Stone Brick and wood Ceramic tiles Other	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	
2-6	What was the primary construction material of the household's roof in the previous location? Chose one only	Thatch/ leaves/grass Plastic sheets Salvaged materials Wood or logs Tiles Metal sheets Cement Low quality mixed materials High quality mixed materials Other	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	
2-7	What was the primary construction material of the household's walls in the previous location? Chose one only	Thatch/ leaves/grass Clay or dung with straw Plastic sheets Salvaged materials Wood or logs Bamboo Metal sheets Concrete/brick/stone Low quality mixed materials High quality mixed materials Other	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	
2-8	What was the primary construction material used for the pillars of your house in the previous location?	Wood Concrete Metal Other	1 2 3 4	
2-9	How long have you been living in this house?	Years: __ __ Months: __ __		
2-10	How much did it cost in total to construct this house?	R _____ \$ _____		
2-11	How long did it take to construct this house?	Months: __ __ Weeks: __ __		
2-12	Did you use materials from your previous house to construct this house?	Most of the materials from my previous house Some of the materials from my previous house None of the materials from my previous house	1 2 3	
2-13	Did you spend money to raise the ground at the site before starting to construct your house?	Yes No	1 2	→2-15
2-14	If yes, how much did it cost to raise the ground at the site?	R _____ \$ _____		
2-15	What is the size of your house?	_____ (m)X _____ (m)		
2-16	How many floors does the house have?	One floor on the ground One floor on stilts	1 2	

		Two floors	3	
2-17	What is the status of your house?	Owned by the household Not owned but no rent is paid Rented Other (Please specify)	1 2 3	
2-18	Do you have paperwork to certify your ownership or rental agreement for this house and land?	Yes Yes – but not in my current possession No - Never had one No - Lost it Don't know	1 2 3 4 5	→2-20 →2-20 →2-20
2-19	What kind of paperwork do you have? (Enumerator to check with the respondent). More than one response is possible	Certificate (land title) from the national gov. Official land investigation paper Official land application paper Occupancy letter (land receipt) from the local authority Transaction letter signed by local authority Transaction letter (not signed by local authority) Rental contract Don't know/not sure Other (Please specify)	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	
2-20	If this land belongs to you, how did you acquire it?	Given by government (Railway Rehab Project) Given by government Given by local authority Given by company Bought the land By inheritance or gift from relatives Given by an NGO Cleared land/occupied for free Other (Please specify)	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	
2-21	What is the primary construction material of the household's floor? (Direct observation of interviewer)	Earth/clay Wood or logs Bamboo strips Brick/Concrete/Stone Brick and wood Ceramic tiles Other	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	
2-22	What is the primary construction material of the household's roof? (Direct observation of interviewer) Chose one only	Thatch/ leaves/grass Plastic sheets Salvaged materials Wood or logs Tiles Metal sheets Cement Low quality mixed materials High quality mixed materials Other	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	
2-23	What is the primary construction material of the household's walls? (Direct observation of interviewer) Chose one only	Thatch/ leaves/grass Clay or dung with straw Plastic sheets Salvaged materials Wood or logs Bamboo Metal sheets Concrete/brick/stone Low quality mixed materials High quality mixed materials Other	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	
2-24	Does your house currently have an electricity connection?	Yes – state connection Yes -private connection Yes- shared connection with a friend/neighbour No - previously had connection but it has been disconnected No - never had a connection	1 2 3 4 5	→2-30
2-25	Did you pay for your electricity connection?	Yes No	1 2	→2-27
2-26	If yes, how much did it cost for the connection fee?	R_____		

		\$ _____		
2-27	How much does electricity cost per Kwh?	R _____ Kwh \$ _____ Kwh		
2-28	How much do you pay for electricity bill per month?	R _____ \$ _____		
2-29	If you do not have a connection, why not?	Cannot afford the connection fee Unable to pay the bills so disconnected Other (please specify)	1 2	
2-30	If no, what is your household's main source of lighting?	Generator Battery Kerosene lamp Candle None Other	1 2 3 4 5 6	
2-31	Do you currently have access to a piped water connection?	Yes – state connection Yes -private connection Yes- shared connection with a friend/neighbour No-previously had connection but disconnected No - never had a connection	1 2 3 4 5 6	
2-32	Did you pay for your water connection?	Yes No	1 2	→2-34
2-33	If yes, how much did it cost for the connection?	R _____ \$ _____		
2-34	If you do not have a connection, why not?	Cannot afford the connection fee Unable to pay the water bills Other (please specify)	1 2	
2-35	What is the main source of drinking water for your household during the wet season?	State piped Private piped Private water bought in truck or by vendor Purified water (bottle or container) Pump Well Open well Rain water Pond, rice field, river	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	
2-36	What is the main source of drinking water for your family during the dry season?	State piped Private piped Private water bought in truck or by vendor Purified water (bottle or container) Pump Well Open well Rain water Pond, rice field, river	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	
2-37	How much does water cost per unit?	R _____ month/container/m ³ \$ _____ month/container/m ³		
2-38	How much do you pay for the bill of water per month?	R _____ \$ _____		
2-39	What is your main energy for cooking?	Firewood Charcoal Gas Kerosene Electricity Household generator None/don't cook Other (please specify)	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	
2-40	Which toilet facility does your household have ?	Pour flush or flush connected to sewerage Pour flush or flush connected to septic tank/pit Pour flush or flush to elsewhere (not tank/pit) Pit latrine Latrine overhanging field or water Public toilet/pit latrine shared with others Open land Other (please specify)	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	

2-41	Which toilet facility does your household usually use?	Pour flush or flush connected to sewerage Pour flush or flush connected to septic tank/pit Pour flush or flush to elsewhere (not tank/pit) Pit latrine Latrine overhanging field or water Public toilet/pit latrine shared with others Open land Other (please specify)	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	
2-42	Have you made improvements to the toilet provided on your plot?	Yes No	1 2	→2-44
2-43	If yes, how much did you spend?	R _____ \$ _____		
2-44	If you do not use the toilet provided on your plot, why don't you use it? (Multiple answers allowed)	The toilet gets flooded after rains The toilet gets blocked when the tank is full The toilet building is too small Other (please specify)	1 2 3	
2-45	Does the community have a drainage system?	Yes No	1 2	→3-1
2-46	How does the drainage system function? (Multiple answers allowed)	Adequate Water does not drain into the system The system gets blocked after rains The system is damaged Other (please specify)	1 2 3 4	

SECTION 3: HEALTH

No.	Question	Answer	Code	Skip
3-1	Please tell me if any member of your household is sick, has an illness or injury now or at any time in the last 90 days/3 months?	Yes No	1 2	→4-1
3-2	Was consultation or treatment sought for this illness or injury?	Yes No	1 2	
3-3	In the last 90 days/3 months, how many times was treatment sought for this illness?	Household member 1 _ _ Household member 2 _ _ Household member 3 _ _		
3-4	In the last 90 days, for all household members who were sick which was the most usual health provider sought for treatment?	National Hospital City Hospital District hospital Health centre Private hospital Private clinic Private pharmacy NGO Other (please specify)	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	
3-5	How far is this health provider from your home?	0-5km 6km – 10km 11km – 15km 16km – 20km More than 20km	1 2 3 4 5	
3-6	How much in total was spent on transportation to go to and return from the most usual provider in the last 90 days/3months?	R _____ \$ _____		
3-7	How much in total was spent on treatment from most usual provider in the last 90 days?	R _____ \$ _____		

SECTION 4: EDUCATION Please provide information regarding all children in the household who are aged between 3 and 18 years of age?

4-1	4-2	4-3	4-4	4-5	4-6	4-7	4-8
Age	Gender:	Did this child regularly attend school in your previous location?	Is this child currently in the school system?	If yes, what is his/her current grade?	If yes, is this school:	If yes, what is the distance (km) from your home to the school?	If no, why is the child not currently in the school system?
	1=Male 2=Female	1=Yes 2=No	1=Yes 2=No		1=State 2=Private 3=NGO 4=Other	1=Less than 2km 2=2-5km 3=6-10km 4=More than 10km	

SECTION 5: FOOD SECURITY

No.	Question	Answer	Code	Skip
5-1	To support your household on a normal day each month, how much do you spend on food?	R _____ day \$ _____ day		
5-2	For example, how much did you spend yesterday?	R _____ day \$ _____ day		
5-3	How many meals per day have members of this household had during the last 1 month?	_ _		
5-4	In the month immediately after moving to this site, did your household have enough food every day or were there days with very little food or no food so that the household was very hungry?	Enough food Not enough food	1 2	
5-5	During the last 6 months has your household had enough food to eat every day or are there days with very little food or no food so that the household is very hungry?	Enough food Not enough food	1 2	
5-6	During the last 6 months has it been necessary for your household to eat less nutritious food (worse, less delicious, less nutritious food) because of a lack of food or money?	Yes No	1 2	
5-7	During the last 12 months, has your household's overall amount and quality of food....?	Greatly worsened Worsened Stayed the same Improved Greatly improved	1 2 3 4 5	

SECTION 6: HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC SITUATION

SECTION 6a): INCOMES

No.	Questions	Answer	Code	Skip
6a-1	How many members of your household are aged 18 and above?	No: _ _		
6a-2	Before moving to Trapeang Anhchanh, how many members of your household earned an income?	No: _ _		
6a-3	Before moving to Trapeang Anhchanh, what was your total gross monthly household income and	INCOME R _____ month \$ _____ month	EXPENDITURE R _____ month \$ _____ month	

	expenditure?		
6a-4	Since moving to Trapeang Anhchanh, how many members of your household earn an income?		
6a-5	Since moving to Trapeang Anhchanh, what is your total gross monthly household income and expenditure?	INCOME R _____ month \$ _____ month	EXPENDITURE R _____ month \$ _____ month

Please detail information about the activities of all household members over the age of 18 before moving to the resettlement site?

6a-6	6a-7	6a-8	6a-9	6a-10	6a-11
Gender 1 =Male 2 =Female	Age	Activity 1=Income earner 2=Works for family business 3=House wife/husband 4=Unemployed 5=Student 6=Retired 7=Other (please specify)	If income earner, which occupation?	Amount Earned	Distance from home (km) 1=0-5km 2>=6km – 10km 3=11km – 15km 4=16km – 20km 5=More than 20km
				R _____ day/week/month \$ _____ day/week/month No. of days per week? _____	
				R _____ day/week/month \$ _____ day/week/month No. of days per week? _____	
				R _____ day/week/month \$ _____ day/week/month No. of days per week? _____	
				R _____ day/week/month \$ _____ day/week/month No. of days per week? _____	
				R _____ day/week/month \$ _____ day/week/month No. of days per week? _____	

Please detail information about the activities of all household members over the age of 18 after moving to the resettlement site?

6a-12	6a-13	6a-14	6a-15	6a-16	6a-17
Gender 1 =Male 2 =Female	Age	Activity 1=Income earner 2=Works for family business 3=House wife/husband 4=Unemployed 5=Student 6=Retired 7=Other (please specify)	If income earner, which occupation?	Amount Earned	Distance from home (km) 1=0-5km 2>=6km – 10km 3=11km – 15km 4=16km – 20km 5=More than 20km
				R _____ day/week/month \$ _____ day/week/month No. of days per week? _____	
				R _____ day/week/month \$ _____ day/week/month No. of days per week? _____	
				R _____ day/week/month \$ _____ day/week/month	

				No. of days per week? _____	
				R _____ day/week/month \$ _____ day/week/month	
				No. of days per week? _____	
				R _____ day/week/month \$ _____ day/week/month	
				No. of days per week? _____	

No.	Question	Answer	Code	Skip
6a-18	Since moving to this location, have any of your household members lost their jobs?	Yes No	1 2	
6a-19	If yes, how many male and female household members have lost their jobs?	Male _ _ Female _ _		
6a-20	Over the last 12 months has your overall household economic situation.....?	Greatly worsened Worsened Stayed the Same Improved Greatly improved	1 2 3 4 5	

SECTION 6b) SAVINGS

No	Questions	Answer	Code	Skip
6b-1	Prior to resettlement, comparing all of your income and expenses, was there money left over to save?	Yes No	1 2	→6b-4
6b-2	If yes, how much did you save?	R _____ day/week/month \$ _____ day/week/month		
6b-3	If yes, how did you save?	Bank MFI Savings group Bought gold NGO At home With friends/relatives Other (please specify)	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	
6b-4	Since resettlement, comparing all of your income and expenses, is there money left over to save?	Yes No	1 2	
6b-5	If yes, how much do you save?	R _____ day/week/month \$ _____ day/week/month		
6b-6	If yes, how do you save?	Bank MFI Savings group (SBK) Other savings group Buy gold NGO At home With friends/relatives Other (please specify)	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	

SECTION 6c) MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD CASH FLOW

	Before Moving to Trapeang Anchanh	After Moving to Trapeang Anchanh
	HOUSEHOLD INFLOWS	
	Income 1	
	Income 2	
	Income 3	

	Income 4		
	Income 5		
	HOUSEHOLD OUTFLOWS		
	Rent		
	Food		
	Electricity, water, telephone, cooking		
	Education		
	Health		
	Pay off loans/debts		
	Ceremonies, festivals etc.		
	Home construction or repairs		
	Transportation		
	Savings and insurance		

SECTION 7: INDEBTEDNESS

No.	Question	Answer	Code	Skip
7-1	Does your family currently owe money to anyone?	Yes No	1 2	
7-2	Are you currently facing difficulties re-paying your debts?	Yes No	1 2	

Please detail the household's outstanding debts?

7-3	7-4	7-5	7-6	7-7	7-8	7-9	7-10
Loan Amount	Loan Source 1=Bank 2=MFI 3=Money lender 4=Friends/relatives 5=NGO 6=SBK 7=Other (please specify)	Collateral 1=Land title 2=Occupancy letter/land receipt 3=Transaction letter 4=National ID Card 5=Family book 6=Cash deposit 7=Other (please specify) (Multiple responses possible)	Primary Loan Purpose 1=Food expenses 2=Home construction 3=Home improvement 4=Education 5=Health 6=Invest in existing business 7=Start new business 8=Purchase assets 9=Festival/ceremonies 10=Pay off existing debt 11=Other (please specify)	Other loan purposes (see codes – multiple responses allowed)	Monthly Interest Rate %	Monthly Interest Payment	Remaining Loan Principle
R _____ \$ _____						R _____ \$ _____	R _____ \$ _____
R _____ \$ _____						R _____ \$ _____	R _____ \$ _____
R _____ \$ _____						R _____ \$ _____	R _____ \$ _____

SECTION 8: CHALLENGES

No.	Question	Answer																																							
	What are the top 3 challenges that you are currently facing? I will read a list of options and please rank the top 3.																																								
	<table> <tr> <th>No</th><th>Challenges</th><th>Ranking (1,2,3)</th></tr> <tr><td>1</td><td>Food security</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>2</td><td>Unemployment/job loss/reduced incomes</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>3</td><td>Indebtedness</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>4</td><td>Limited access to education facilities</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>5</td><td>Limited access to health facilities</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>6</td><td>Utility fees are expensive</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>7</td><td>Poor sanitation (toilets, sewerage, and drainage)</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>8</td><td>Flooding</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>9</td><td>The community is unsafe</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>10</td><td>Poor quality housing</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>11</td><td>Problems with the local authorities</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td></td><td>Other</td><td></td></tr> </table>	No	Challenges	Ranking (1,2,3)	1	Food security		2	Unemployment/job loss/reduced incomes		3	Indebtedness		4	Limited access to education facilities		5	Limited access to health facilities		6	Utility fees are expensive		7	Poor sanitation (toilets, sewerage, and drainage)		8	Flooding		9	The community is unsafe		10	Poor quality housing		11	Problems with the local authorities			Other		
No	Challenges	Ranking (1,2,3)																																							
1	Food security																																								
2	Unemployment/job loss/reduced incomes																																								
3	Indebtedness																																								
4	Limited access to education facilities																																								
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6	Utility fees are expensive																																								
7	Poor sanitation (toilets, sewerage, and drainage)																																								
8	Flooding																																								
9	The community is unsafe																																								
10	Poor quality housing																																								
11	Problems with the local authorities																																								
	Other																																								

SECTION 9: HOUSEHOLD COPING STRATEGIES

No.	Question	Answer	Code	Skip
9-1	How do you cope when you household's income is not enough to meet your expenses? Multiple responses are possible	Reduce the number of meals per day Eat less food at each meal Eat less expensive food Find natural food Borrow food from friends/relatives Borrow money from friends/relatives Take out a loan Seek alternative/additional jobs Family members migrate for job Sell domestic assets Sell land Other (please specify)	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	

SECTION 10: SOCIAL CAPITAL/COHESION

No.	Question	Answer	Code	Skip
10-1	I will read 4 choices for you to choose. Please tell me which response best describes the situation of your household in this community:	We do not have many good friends/neighbours We have some good friends/neighbours We have many good friends/neighbours All the neighbours here are good friends of ours	1 2 3 4	
10-2	Generally speaking, do you think that people can be trusted, or that you should be careful when dealing with people?	People can be trusted You should be careful when dealing with people	1 2	
10-3	Are you, or is someone in your household currently a member of a group, organisation, or association which represents your interests?	Yes No	1 2	
10-4	To what extent do you agree with the following statement: "I feel safe and secure in this community"	Strongly agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree Disagree Strongly disagree	1 2 3 4 5	

SECTION 11: SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS FOR US?
THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS SURVEY!!

