

# Human Rights and the World Bank Safeguards Review

Lessons from Ethiopia: Forced Villagization and the Protection of Basic Services Project



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## **Background**

Landlocked in the Horn of Africa and beset by periodic droughts and famine, Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world. A significant segment of its population of 94 million is food insecure, and 10 to 20 percent rely on food aid every day to survive.<sup>1</sup> Many Ethiopians, particularly rural dwellers, lack access to basic services, including water, sanitation, education and health facilities.

Since the ousting of the Soviet-backed “Derg” military regime in 1991, the Government of Ethiopia (GoE), led by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), has implemented a vast program of economic recovery and reform meant to address the dire poverty and enormous social and economic needs of the population. The government and its development partners claim impressive strides towards meeting the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and significant progress in key human development indicators over the past two decades, including a quadrupling in primary school enrollments, halving of child mortality, and a doubling of the number of people with access to clean water.<sup>2</sup>

Yet, in parallel to its economic reform agenda the government has become increasingly oppressive and intolerant of criticism and dissent. As articulated by Human Rights Watch, the government has “severely restricted the rights of expression and association, arbitrarily detained political opponents, intimidated journalists, shuttered media outlets, and made independent human rights and election monitoring practically impossible.”<sup>3</sup>

These ongoing and regular human rights abuses are rarely openly acknowledged by the bilateral and multilateral donors to Ethiopia, who fund more than a third of the government’s annual budget.<sup>4</sup> Ethiopia is one of the world’s largest recipients of foreign aid, receiving approximately US\$3 billion in funds annually from its development partners, including the United States, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the European Commission, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands.<sup>5</sup> Largely turning a blind eye to the increasingly repressive political climate, donors justify their support by both the enormity of the need and the reported inroads achieved in reducing poverty since the EPRDF came to power.<sup>6</sup> Ethiopia’s late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi forged close alliances with western nations based on a common interest in combatting Islamic extremism and establishing greater stability in the volatile region.<sup>7</sup>

Throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s, the World Bank and other donors supported the GoE by providing direct budget support through a series of Structural Adjustment Credits and Poverty Reduction Support Operations, in addition to several specific purpose projects. In 2004/05 direct budget support from all donors constituted approximately one third of total aid to Ethiopia,<sup>8</sup> placing significant aid amounts directly in government hands with minimal control and oversight, despite evidence of egregious human rights abuses being perpetrated by the government and military.<sup>9</sup>

## **The Protection of Basic Services Project**

Government perpetrated violence and human rights abuses following the 2005 national election propelled multilateral and bilateral donors to shift their financing relationship with the GoE. State security forces had reacted to a series of election-related protests with excessive force, killing 200 and arresting over 30,000 people.<sup>10</sup> Although this was not the first time the government had used violence, including open gunfire, to suppress dissent, the widely publicized events led to a

suspension of direct budget support by the World Bank and other members of the Development Assistance Group (DAG), a consortium of 26 donors to Ethiopia.

The World Bank explained the decision as follows:

...Heightened risks on the governance front have become apparent, with concerns that the political tensions have the potential to adversely impact economic governance and the larger development agenda... Partners based this decision on their perception of increased risks relating to governance, particularly the risk that unconstrained budget support could be vulnerable to political capture or diversion from the core priority of basic service delivery. Furthermore, donor support for scaling-up appears unlikely without some clear improvements on the governance front.<sup>11</sup>

Despite these real and grave concerns that direct aid flows could underwrite political discrimination and repression, donors devised a number of new instruments through which to channel their aid into the government budget, theoretically with increased mechanisms for transparency and accountability. The largest of these instruments in terms of dollar amounts and sectoral spread was the Protection of Basic Services (PBS) program. PBS aims to expand access to and improve the quality of basic services in five sectors: education, health, agriculture, water supply and sanitation, and rural roads.<sup>12</sup> Through PBS, donors transfer “block grants” to the federal government, which then disperses combined donor and government funds to regional and district (*woreda*) governments, responsible for the decentralized delivery, operation and maintenance of basic services.<sup>13</sup> PBS is designed to incorporate a number of systems and tools to strengthen fiscal and social transparency and accountability as well as monitoring and evaluation.<sup>14</sup> The World Bank has contributed approximately US\$1.4 billion in grants and loans to the program through PBS project phase I (2006-2009) and phase II (2009 – 2013)<sup>15</sup> and committed an additional US\$600 million loan for phase III (2012 – 2018).<sup>16</sup>

The PBS project objectives are indisputably laudable and aim to meet a number of dire needs of the Ethiopian population. There is evidence, however, that PBS funds are being used to commit grave human rights abuses. The risk identified by the World Bank that “unconstrained budget support” could be misused has been realized in the absence of robust safeguards, accountability mechanisms and oversight. Project documents sought to distinguish the modality utilized for PBS from previous forms of direct donor support through a commitment to “timely and detailed reporting”, “explicit monitoring and oversight”, and “the introduction of measures to encourage local accountability.”<sup>17</sup> In reality, however, PBS has closely resembled previous modes of support with almost complete discretion left to national and sub-national governments to design programs at the local level to meet PBS objectives.

According to the Bank “the PBS itself has no direct mechanism to influence choices made at the local government level.”<sup>18</sup> It is very difficult, if not impossible, for the Bank to track the use of its funds since “[t]here are no separate bank accounts beyond the initial entry point into the Treasury and no separate disbursement or accounting procedures.”<sup>19</sup> The DAG has acknowledged that the suspension of direct budget support is “viewed to some extent as predominantly symbolic since much of the assistance allocated to general budgetary support has been diverted to other program-based aid instruments such as the Protection of Basic Services (PBS) programme...”<sup>20</sup> A leaked confidential United States diplomatic cable dated 2009 stated:

Direct budget support, which the [United States] does not provide but is favored by many

donors, is the most vulnerable form of assistance. As an example, Post has received numerous reports of graft and politicization of donor support provided through the Provision of Basic Services (PBS) program [sic], which provides block grants to regional governments and is coordinated by the World Bank.<sup>21</sup>

### **Forced Displacement and “Villagization” in Gambella**

In the region of Gambella the government’s principle means of delivering basic services is through the implementation of the “Villagization Program Action Plan”, which commenced in mid to late 2010 during phase II of PBS. According to the Action Plan, “villagization” is to occur in all *woredas* in Gambella with the goal of creating “access to basic socioeconomic infrastructures of those people who are settled scattered and along the riverside...and those who practiced cut & burn shifting cultivation...[sic]”<sup>22</sup> Under the three-year plan, 45,000 households were to be resettled in new villages in which schools, water schemes, health posts, roads and other infrastructure would be erected in order to facilitate better access to basic services, improve food security, and “bring socioeconomic and cultural transformation of the people.”<sup>23</sup>

In May to June 2011, Human Rights Watch interviewed over 100 people affected by the villagization program in Gambella. It found widespread human rights abuses at all stages of the program, described in detail in the 2012 report, “Waiting Here for Death.” Despite the government’s assertions that all resettlement under the project is voluntary,<sup>24</sup> Human Rights Watch found clear evidence of forced displacement and a “resettlement” process plagued by threats, harassment, beatings and assault by soldiers in some cases leading to death; arbitrary arrest and detention; and rape and other sexual violence.<sup>25</sup> Almost all of the villagers interviewed told Human Rights Watch that they were resettled through an involuntary, forced process.<sup>26</sup> One villager in Adobo *woreda* said: “We were told, “If somebody refuses, the government will take action” - so the people went to the new village - by force.”<sup>27</sup>

One man described what happened to his friend following a public meeting on villagization in Gambella town:

“If people are not being told why, do we have to go?” my friend [name withheld] said at the public meeting. This meeting took place in the day, then in the night, people were beaten by the EDF [Ethiopian Defense Force, army] and accused of mobilizing farmers against villagization. Two of my friends were beaten, arrested, and taken to hospital [he showed photos of two beaten friends]. The next day there was another meeting. And my friend [who had spoken up the day before] got emotional at the meeting. When the meeting was over the EDF followed him into town at night and shot him from behind through the neck [showed photograph]. The two army officers were at the earlier meeting.<sup>28</sup>

At the new villages resettled people lack access to food and livelihood opportunities. Several villagers spoke of people that had “starved to death”.<sup>29</sup> Promised basic services and facilities are often not provided or are not operational.<sup>30</sup> Hundreds of Gambellans, mainly young men, have fled the intolerable conditions and sought asylum in neighboring Kenya and South Sudan.<sup>31</sup> One villager stated:

The government is killing our people through starvation and hunger. It is better to attack us in one place than just waiting here together to die. If you attack us, some of us could run, and some could survive. But this, we are

dying here with our children. Government workers get this salary, but we are just waiting here for death.<sup>32</sup>

Many of those affected by villagization are Anuak, an ethnic minority, indigenous to East Africa, who consider the areas upon which they reside, cultivate and otherwise use as traditional lands. One Anuak elder resettled under the villagization program said:

We want you to be clear that the government brought us here... to die... right here.... We want the world to hear that the government brought the Anuak people here to die. They brought us no food, they gave away our land to the foreigners so we can't even move back. On all sides the land is given away, so we will die here in one place.<sup>33</sup>

Villagization is not limited to Gambella. A study into villagization in Benishangul-Gumuz published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland found that some members of affected communities said that they did not relocate of their own free will, but did so out of fear of imprisonment or to otherwise “avoid trouble”.<sup>34</sup> It further reports that some women stated that officials demolished or threatened to burn down houses.<sup>35</sup> Villagization is also reportedly occurring in the regions Somali and Afar. According to published reports a total of 1.5 million people throughout the lowland areas of the country will be resettled under villagization programs.<sup>36</sup>

There is evidence that forced evictions under the villagization program are taking place in fertile areas where significant investment in commercial farming is planned or is already occurring.<sup>37</sup> A former regional civil servant told Human Rights Watch that the link between villagization and the transfer of land for agricultural investment was well known within the government: “The [regional] Bureau of Agriculture head told me that land that is left will be given to investors.”<sup>38</sup> Finnmap reported that affected people that they interviewed thought that “releasing land to investors was a hidden agenda in the [villagization program].”<sup>39</sup>

## **The PBS Funds and Forced Villagization**

According to project documents for PBS Phase II, Bank and other donor funds that are transferred as block grants to the national government are then distributed to all regions and districts to cover salaries of *woreda* officials, and operations and maintenance of basic services and infrastructure.<sup>40</sup> Bank documents state that flows from PBS constitute “the major source of funding for *woredas*.”<sup>41</sup> A 2011 Study on Strengthening Grievance Redress Mechanisms for PBS commissioned by the GoE and its Development Partners confirmed: “In effect one can argue that PBS pays a portion of the compensation of all regional government and local government employees (not just salaries and benefits in the five sectors enumerated above) because PBS funds are commingled with funds from other sources that regional state and local governments use to pay employee compensation.”<sup>42</sup>

The World Bank insists that PBS funds do not contribute to the Villagization Program in Gambella or elsewhere.<sup>43</sup> The Bank told Human Rights Watch and Inclusive Development International that it is able to track how PBS funds are being used down to the *woreda* level, and emphasized that they are used to pay the salaries of public servants such as schoolteachers, health professionals and agricultural extension workers.<sup>44</sup> However, former teachers and agricultural workers from Gambella region, now refugees, have explained how they and other public servants were ordered to implement the Villagization Program. For example, the former head of a zone education department told Inclusive Development International that he was appointed, along with the health, agriculture

and water-sanitation department heads, to implement the Villagization Program in their zone by informing farmers in different *kebeles* (villages) that they would have to move. He said that when he reported back to the regional government that the farmers did not accept, he was beaten severely by Ethiopian Defense Forces and coerced to return with them to the *kebeles* to force the communities to move.<sup>45</sup>

One teacher told Inclusive Development International:

What we were told, everybody and anybody on the payroll of the government, they have to do their part. And not only the teachers, all the administration, everybody has to participate and do the work. And people who are opposing it, they will be detained. They will be jailed, or taken to the military camp...<sup>46</sup>

A multi-agency “Villagization” mission to Gambella Regional State report from June 2012, endorsed by the Development Assistance Group, states:

The [Gambella Villagization] plan is carried out under the authority of a Steering Committee chaired by the Regional President, and coordinated by the Regional Bureau of Agriculture. Various sector bureaus including education, health and water are responsible for implementation. The Steering Committee is cascaded through to the various local government structures (zonal, woreda, kebele).

Contrary to the assurances of the World Bank, it is therefore evident that PBS funds are contributing to the Villagization Program by paying the salaries of Gambella public servants involved in implementing the Villagization Program. Moreover, the World Bank Inspection Panel found that “it is most likely that PBS, through block grants for recurrent expenditures, has been instrumental in establishing and operating services in new villages created under the VP [Villagization Program].”<sup>47</sup>

### **PBS and the Involuntary Resettlement Policy**

In World Bank appraisal documentation on PBS I and II not a single mention is made of villagization as a potential means for service delivery; nor does it raise the risk that Bank funds might be used to carry out forced relocations. This omission calls into question the Bank’s diligence in carrying out social and environmental risk analysis since villagization, often of a coercive nature, has been used historically in Ethiopia as a means of “development” of certain populations, and in particular to improve access to basic services.<sup>48</sup> Even after the Villagization Program was fully underway in both Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz, documentation prepared to seek additional financing to support PBS Phase II in early 2011 does not mention villagization. The project appraisal document for PBS III refers to villagization only briefly in an annex, as a reputational risk to the Bank.<sup>49</sup> The absence of any substantive discussion of villagization in PBS III documentation is striking since by the time the proposed phase III was being appraised, the Human Rights Watch report, drawing credible links between villagization and PBS, had been published and the concerns brought to the direct attention of the Bank on several occasions.

Given the fact that forced relocations were not identified as a project risk, it is unsurprising that the Bank did not trigger Operational Policy (OP) 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement, other than for the specific circumstances of compulsory acquisition of land for the construction of small-scale civil works under one sub-component of PBS II.<sup>50</sup> The Bank also did not trigger Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples for any aspect of PBS, despite the many and diverse tribes in Ethiopia, including

the Anuak, and the fact that the design of the project made it impossible for PBS not to affect Indigenous Peoples.

Although OP 4.12 is an awkward fit to PBS for several reasons, it would have been possible for the Bank to interpret its scope to cover the circumstances in Ethiopia, which in turn could have had the effect of preventing Bank funds being used to commit grave human rights violations. The Bank's rationalization for not triggering safeguard policies was that since PBS only covers recurrent expenditures (salaries, operations, maintenance) it would not require the involuntary taking of land and therefore does not fit within the scope of the policy as articulated in paragraph 3.<sup>51</sup> However, OP 4.12 offers an alternative entry point for its application. Paragraph 4 provides that the policy "also applies to other activities resulting in involuntary resettlement, that in the judgment of the Bank, are (a) directly and significantly related to the Bank-assisted project, (b) necessary to achieve its objectives..., and (c) carried out...contemporaneously with the project."<sup>52</sup> The villagization program in Gambella appears to fit each of these criteria as it is directly and significantly related to PBS, since, according to the Program Action Plan, it is the very strategy by which the Gambella regional government aimed to achieve project objectives, during the lifespan of PBS II. A restriction of the use of project funds to recurrent expenditures does not appear to bar the application of the policy pursuant to paragraph 4.

Yet even if the villagization program was not necessary to achieve the objectives of the Bank-assisted project or not carried out contemporaneously with it, why should the policy not apply to any activity resulting in displacement that is directly and significantly related to a Bank-assisted project, and indeed, to any activity financed, wholly or partly, by World Bank funds? The case of PBS illustrates how a restrictive interpretation of the criteria for triggering the application of OP 4.12 can lead to a situation where Bank financing is contributing to forced displacement and related human rights abuses without any safeguards in place or legal remedies available to avoid complicity.

The case of PBS also underscores the need to expand the scope of the policy so that it can also apply to voluntary resettlement processes. Under international human rights law, it is never acceptable to resettle a group of people involuntarily as a means to improve their access to services in the manner that has occurred under the villagization program. This justification for involuntary resettlement is clearly distinguishable from cases in which eviction is permissible under international law. Evictions are allowed when they are undertaken solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare, consistent with international human rights obligations, and where no viable alternatives to meeting those general welfare objectives are available.\* The principle that forced displacement should only occur where absolutely necessary, is reflected in the primary objective of OP 4.12: "involuntary resettlement should be avoided where feasible... exploring all viable alternative project designs."<sup>53</sup> Had OP 4.12 been applied, meeting this objective would have required measures to be put in place to avoid, and indeed preclude, the involuntary nature of resettlement under the villagization program.

However, under these hypothetical circumstances, had anyone freely chosen to resettle into a "village" under the program in order to improve their access to services, they still would have been well served by the protections and entitlements stipulated in OP 4.12. For example, access to information, consultation, and the provision of assistance to resettle, are equally as relevant to

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\* Evictions must also be authorized by law; carried out in accordance with international human rights law; and reasonable and proportionate. (UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-based Evictions and Displacement, para 21. See also Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comments 4 and 7.)

voluntary resettlement processes as they are to those of an involuntary nature. Indeed, anyone who chooses to relocate in such circumstances should still be “assisted in their efforts to improve livelihoods and standards of living or at least restore them, in real terms, to pre-displacement levels...”<sup>54</sup>

The failure to identify the risk that Bank funds would be used to implement forced relocations and to mitigate those risks through the application of safeguard policies ultimately meant that complete discretion was given to the GoE and local governments to design the means by which PBS objectives would be achieved. Ultimately these circumstances have exposed intended beneficiaries of PBS to severe harm and human rights violations - a result indisputably contrary to the objectives and spirit of the Bank’s safeguard policies and of PBS itself.<sup>†</sup>

## Policy Lessons

The case highlights how the language defining the scope of the involuntary resettlement policy is not well suited to important situations in which Bank funds contribute to physical and economic displacement. It should be made clear that even in cases in which (a) Bank funds and project benefits will flow to all regions, districts, provinces or states throughout a country, and (b) even in cases in which significant discretion is left to subnational governments to design the means of project implementation to meet project objectives in their own localities, the safeguard policy must apply where the possibility of displacement is identified.

The case also underscores the need for a clear statement in the policy that the triggering of OP 4.12 cannot be avoided by limiting Bank contributions to recurrent expenditures. The project must be appraised comprehensively and where risks of displacement are identified, OP 4.12 should be applied.

Moreover, the case highlights the necessity of an unequivocal policy statement that Bank funds cannot be used directly or indirectly to carry out forced evictions or other human rights violations under any circumstances. The policy should clarify that involuntary resettlement is only permitted in exceptional circumstances, solely to promote the general welfare and where no viable alternative exists. The policy should set a “general welfare” threshold that must be met before involuntary resettlement is permitted. A project would not meet the threshold if it does not genuinely fulfil a public purpose; if it will lead to the violation of affected people’s human rights; or if the magnitude of displacement and the degree of risk of harms to affected persons is not reasonable and proportional to its public value. It should be made clear that the Bank will not fund projects that involve or contribute to displacement and/or involuntary resettlement in such circumstances.

Finally, the case illustrates that the scope of the policy should be extended to cover projects that involve *voluntary* resettlement. The measures required in the policy to protect and assist resettlers remain relevant and necessary to respect and fulfill the human rights of targeted beneficiaries of a project who choose to resettle. Extending the scope of the policy to voluntary resettlement will also

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<sup>†</sup> On September 24, Anuak victims of human rights abuses associated with the Gambella Villagization Program submitted a Request for Inspection to the World Bank Inspection Panel asserting that they and their communities had been severely harmed by PBS. Along with complaint to the Inspection Panel, the evidence of PBS funds directly contributing to the implementation of villagization in Gambella was provided to the Board by IDI. The Board nonetheless approved PBS III on September 25 without the application of safeguard policies.

close a loophole that has been used by governments to avoid triggering the policy by asserting that programs of forced relocation are voluntary in nature.

## Recommendations

- 1) The new Safeguard Policy Framework should make clear that the involuntary resettlement policy applies where the risk of displacement is identified and the risk is directly and significantly related to a Bank-assisted project or any activity financed, in whole or part, by the World Bank, including in the following circumstances:
  - (a) Where Bank funds and project benefits will flow to all regions, districts, provinces or states throughout a country.
  - (b) Where discretion is left to subnational governments to design the means of project implementation to meet project objectives in their own localities.
  - (c) Where Bank funds are used for recurrent expenditures.
- 2) The revised involuntary resettlement policy should contain an unequivocal statement that Bank funds cannot be used directly or indirectly to carry out forced evictions or other human rights violations under any circumstances.
- 3) The policy should clarify that involuntary resettlement is only permitted in exceptional circumstances, solely to promote the general welfare and where no viable alternative exists. The policy should set a “general welfare” threshold that must be met before involuntary resettlement is permitted. A project would not meet the threshold if it does not fulfil a public purpose; if it will lead to the violation of affected people’s human rights; or if the magnitude of displacement and the degree of risk of harms to affected persons is not reasonable and proportional to its public value.
- 4) The scope of the revised policy should be extended to cover projects that involve *voluntary* resettlement, with policy entitlements and processes serving as a minimum basis for any agreement.

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<sup>1</sup> Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Development without Freedom,” October 2010, p. 14 and 15.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 12; World Bank, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview>

<sup>3</sup> HRW, “Development without Freedom,” op. cit., p. 4; and DAG Secretariat, “A Profile of Development Partners in Ethiopia: Official Development Assistance,” 2010 (The Development Assistance Group (DAG) “brings together bilateral and multilateral donor agencies operating in Ethiopia in order to enhance effective delivery and utilization of development cooperation in Ethiopia.” ([www.dagethiopia.org](http://www.dagethiopia.org)))

<sup>4</sup> Development Assistance Group ETHIOPIA (DAG), “ODA to Ethiopia,” January 30, 2010, [http://www.dagethiopia.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=21&Itemid=36](http://www.dagethiopia.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=21&Itemid=36); DAG Secretariat, op. cit., p. 10; and HRW, “Development without Freedom,” op. cit., p. 4.

<sup>5</sup> HRW, “Development without Freedom,” op. cit., p. 4.

<sup>6</sup> For example, see DAG Secretariat, “op. cit.”; and the World Bank, “Country Assistance Strategy: Ethiopia 2008 – 2011.”

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, Jeffrey Gettleman, “Ethiopian Leader’s Death Highlights Gap Between U.S. Interests and Ideals,” *The New York Times*, August 21, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/22/world/africa/zenawi-exemplified-conflict-between-american-interests-and-ideals.html?pagewanted=all>.

<sup>8</sup> Development Assistance Group ETHIOPIA (DAG), op. cit.

<sup>9</sup> For example, see HRW, “Targeting the Anuak: Human Rights and Crimes against Humanity in Ethiopia’s Gambella Region, March 24, 2005.

<sup>10</sup> HRW, “Development Without Freedom,” op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>11</sup> World Bank, Project Information Document (PID), Ethiopia PBS Project, 2006, p. 1.

<sup>12</sup> World Bank, Project Appraisal Document (PAD), Ethiopia PBS Phase II Project, 2009.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

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- <sup>14</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>15</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>16</sup> PID, Concept Stage, Ethiopia PBS Program Phase III Project, April 2012, p. 4.
- <sup>17</sup> PID, PBS Project, 2006, p. iv.
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid, p. 3.
- <sup>19</sup> PAD, PBS Phase II Project, 2009, at para 36.
- <sup>20</sup> DAG Secretariat, op. cit., p. 9.
- <sup>21</sup> Confidential communication from United States Embassy in Addis Ababa, Subject: Party patronage and foreign assistance in Ethiopia, November 25, 2009, <http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09ADDISABABA2809&q=ethiopia%20pbs>
- <sup>22</sup> Gambella Peoples' National Regional State, Villagization Program Action Plan (2003 EFY), August 2002, page 1.
- <sup>23</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>24</sup> See, Letter from Minister of Federal Affairs Shiferaw Teklemariam to Human Rights Watch December 2011 reprinted in HRW, "Waiting Here for Death: Displacement and "Villagization" in Ethiopia's Gambella Region", 2012, Appendix IV.
- <sup>25</sup> See, HRW, "Waiting Here for Death", op. cit., pp. 25 to 30.
- <sup>26</sup> See, Ibid, p. 29.
- <sup>27</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with a resident of Abobo woreda, May 2011, reported in Ibid, p. 28.
- <sup>28</sup> Human Rights Watch interview, Dadaab, Kenya, June 18, 2011, reported in ibid, p. 33.
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid, p. 48.
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid, p. 39.
- <sup>31</sup> See, ibid, pp. 25 to 30.
- <sup>32</sup> Human Rights Watch interview, Aboba woreda, May 25, 2011, reported in ibid, p. 45.
- <sup>33</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with a resident of Abobo woreda, May 2011, reported in ibid p. 25.
- <sup>34</sup> Finnmap, "Socio-economic baseline study and assessment of the impact of villagisation", (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland), 2 May 2012, pp. 56 and 67.
- <sup>35</sup> Ibid, p. 56.
- <sup>36</sup> William Davison, "Ethiopia plans ambitious resettlement of people buffered by East Africa drought," *Christian Science Monitor*, August 1, 2011, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2011/0801/Ethiopia-plans-ambitious-resettlement-of-people-buffed-by-East-Africa-drought>
- <sup>37</sup> HRW, "Waiting Here for Death," op. cit., p. 54 and Oakland Institute, "Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa: Ethiopia", 2011.
- <sup>38</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with a former regional government official, Dadaab, Kenya, June 18, 2011, reported in HRW, "Waiting Here for Death, op. cit., p. 54.
- <sup>39</sup> Finnmap, op. cit., p. 57.
- <sup>40</sup> PAD, PBS Phase II Project, 2009, p. 20.
- <sup>41</sup> Ibid, p. 3.
- <sup>42</sup> Robert C Randolph and Buli Edjeta, "Study on Strengthening Grievance Redress Mechanisms for the Protection of the Basic Services (PBS) Program in Ethiopia," 30 September 2011, p. 9.
- <sup>43</sup> Management Response to Request for Inspection Panel Review, November 19, 2012, para. xii.
- <sup>44</sup> Meeting between the World Bank, Human Rights Watch and Inclusive Development International, Nairobi, September 14, 2012.
- <sup>45</sup> Inclusive Development International focus group discussion, South Sudan, September 16, 2012.
- <sup>46</sup> Inclusive Development International interviews, South Sudan, September 17, 2012.
- <sup>47</sup> World Bank Inspection Panel Eligibility Report and Recommendation, February 8, 2013, para, 77.
- <sup>48</sup> See for example, Wubne Mulatu, "Resettlement and villagization. A Country Study: Ethiopia (Thomas P. Ofcansky and LaVerle Berry, editors); Hammond, Laura, "Strategies of Invisibilization: How Ethiopia's Resettlement Programme Hides the Poorest of the Poor," *Oxford University Press Journal of Refugee Studies* Vol. 21, No. 4, 2008; and Christy CannonLorgen, "The Experience of Villagisation: Lessons from Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Tanzania," Oxfam GB, 1999, which refers to a number of other publications on villagization, [http://www.mokoro.co.uk/files/13/file/lria/villagisation\\_experiences\\_eth\\_moz\\_tanz.pdf](http://www.mokoro.co.uk/files/13/file/lria/villagisation_experiences_eth_moz_tanz.pdf) (accessed October 3, 2012).
- <sup>49</sup> PAD, PBS Phase III Project, 2012, Annex 6.
- <sup>50</sup> PAD, PBS Phase II Project, 2009, para. 476.
- <sup>51</sup> Ibid, para. 475.
- <sup>52</sup> OP 4.12, para. 4.
- <sup>53</sup> OP 4.12, at para 2.
- <sup>54</sup> Ibid.